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ABSTRACT
This thesis tests the proposition that a bipolar dis­
tribution of power is more stable than a multipolar distri­
bution. It does this by examining the dynamics of German- 
Soviet relations during two historical periods: one multi­
polar, from 1917 to 1939, and one bipolar from 1948 to 1973.
The thesis concludes that three examples of German-Soviet 
cooperation during the multipolar period— the Treaty of Brest- 
Litovsk, the Rapallo Treaty, and the Molotov-von Rippentrop 
Pact— demonstrate that the freedom of movement afforded by a 
diffuse distribution of power can lead to miscalculation, 
miscommunication and unintended consequences. Alternatively, 
efforts in German-Soviet relations during a bipolar period to 
resolve issues arising from the division of Europe— such as 
the Stalin Note of 1952, the Second Berlin Crisis 1958-1961, 
and Willy Brandt*s Ostpolitik 1969-1973— demonstrate the 
tendency within a tight bipolar system to solidify and 
reaffirm the established balance of power.
GERMAN-SOVIET RELATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
INTRODUCTION
In 1989 the German Democratic Republic broke open the 
Berlin Wall. The following year, the Soviet Union approved 
the reunification of Germany as a member of the North Atlan­
tic Treaty Organization. By the end of 1991, the Soviet 
Union had dissolved into fifteen separate states and the 
Communist Party had relinquished official permanent govern­
ing status in each of the former member countries of the 
Warsaw Pact. These events occurred with amazingly little 
bloodshed and with surprisingly little enthusiasm by the 
Soviet bloc's supposedly mortal enemies in NATO.
Only three years prior to these events, Anton DePorte 
republished his thought-provoking, but eminently reasonable, 
1977 essay. In it he maintained that the division of Europe 
was so stable, and so much in the interest of those with the 
power to change it, that it would likely last into the next 
century. DePorte based his thesis on three points. The 
first was the decline and death of the classical European 
state system. The second was the transformation of the 
system, as a result of the Cold War, into a bipolar system, 
that was essentially extra-European, in that the two poles 
were the Soviet Union and the United States. The third was
2
3that by 1977 this system was likely to continue as a power 
relationship independent of a continuance of the Cold War.1
DePorte acknowledged the value of the classical Europe­
an state system, which has been credited with assuring the 
continued existence of the major states for over four 
centuries through the constant shifting of alliances, which 
prevented the balance of power from moving permanently in 
favor of any one state or coalition.2 In the end, the 
system failed, of course. DePorte argued that it was unable 
to contain the power of Germany after its unification in 
1871, and German power finally had to be subdued in World 
War II by the United States and the Soviet Union.3 The 
post-1945 system, roughly symmetrical with the United States 
and the Soviet Union as poles, rested on the division of 
Germany between the two camps. This division of Germany, 
and the division of Europe, as a consequence, satisfied the
^.W. DePorte, Europe between the Superpowers: The
Enduring Balance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), p.
ix.
2DePorte fixes the start of the balance of power system 
to 1494, when Charles VIII of France invaded Italy. In 
response, Spain and the Holy Roman Empire also became 
involved. Ibid., p. 2.
3DePorte credits Alexis de Toqueville with predicting, as 
early as the 1830s, that the America and Russia were destined 
one day each to control half the world. However, DePorte 
argues that De Toqueville only predicted the result (American 
and Russian ascendency). It remains DePorte's theme that it 
was German power, not American or Russian, that caused the end 
of the European system. Ibid., p. 9.
4interests of all the parties that had the power to alter the 
system.4
What can be said, then, of DePorte's thesis given that 
the Cold War division of Europe came to an end, thereby 
confounding his prediction? One side of the bipolar ar­
rangement unilaterally abandoned the most recognizable 
aspects of the system only three years after DePorte con­
firmed his earlier analysis! One can begin by saying that 
in most ways DePorte was right; the bipolar division of 
Europe was remarkably stable. The first half of the 20th 
century saw two tremendous general European wars that spread 
to various theaters around the world, but the division of 
Europe into opposing blocs in 1948 lasted forty years 
without an inch of territory passing from one to the other. 
For forty years the Cold War featured arms races, threats, 
ideological animosity, continuance of superpower rivalry 
into non-European spheres, every conceivable effort by one 
side to gain advantage over the other, and the constant fear 
of thermonuclear war, but the result was a remarkably stable 
system. At the base of each side's warlike efforts through­
out the previous forty years had been the sure knowledge 
that if either side let down its defenses for even a moment, 
the other side would instantly realize its much ballyhooed 
imperialistic designs. Despite this, the bipolar system 
ended unilaterally and with superpower cooperation. The
4Ibid., p. x-xii.
5actual events showed how far the protagonists had come to 
value stablity and the mutual recognition of a division that 
guaranteed peace. DePorte's prediction was far less unimag­
inable and fantastic than the actual events of the past five 
years.
The bipolar distribution of power ended, suprisingly, 
but we can still ask if DePorte was correct to argue that 
the classical balance of power system failed because it 
could not contain German power and that the bipolar division 
of Europe was more stable because it could contain German 
power? DePorte did not really address the issues of 
multipolarity or bipolarity as abstract or general concepts 
but discussed only what actually had occurred in Europe over 
the previous sixty years. However, the question of the 
superiority of either the bipolar or multipolar arrangement 
at reducing the outbreak of war has been discussed intermit­
tently by others during the Cold War period without an 
agreed conclusion. Michael Haas, for example, undertook an 
"empirical" examination of multipolar, bipolar and unipolar 
systems which tested them for longevity, frequency of 
outbreak of war, and intensity of war. He found that 
unipolar systems were the most pacific, but were almost 
obsolete. He found wars to break out less frequently in 
bipolar systems, but to last longer. Multipolar systems
6were said to sport the more frequent wars, involving more
violence and more countries than bipolar systems.5
Jack Levy conducted a similar examination fifteen years
later and also found that the data showed bipolarity to be
more stable than multipolarity. Using his improved set of
examples, however, he found unipolar systems to be the least
stable.6 Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer, on the other
hand, provided a logical explanation for why bipolarity
could be presumed to be less likely than multipolarity to
lead to stability:
In such a mobile multipolar world, no government 
needs to fear a moderate decline in national power 
as potentially disastrous. It can survive as a 
second-class power as safely or precariously as it 
did as a first class one, provided only that it 
joins in time the appropriate new alliance or 
alignment. Arms increases by a rival power, which 
in a bipolar world might pose a fatal threat, 
might call in a multipolar world for little more 
than a quick adjustment of alliances.7
For a system to be stable, according to their hypothesis, 
Deutsch and Singer required only that it retain its essen­
tial characteristics: that it allow no state to become
dominant, that it allow most members of the system to
5Michael Haas, "International Subsystems: Stability and
Polarity," American Political Science Review. Volume 64, 1970,
p. 121.
6Jack S. Levy, "The Polarity of the System and Inter­
national Stability: An Empirical Analysis," Polarity and War:
The Changing Structure of International Conflict. Ned 
Sabrosky, ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), p. 58.
7Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, "Multipolar Power 
Systems and International Stability," World Politics. Volume 
16, 1964, p. 403.
7survive over the life of the system, and that it allow no 
large scale war to break out.8
"The balance of power has been transformed from a 
multipolar into a bipolar one," lamented Hans J. Morgenthau 
in 1967, a fan of the classical, multipolar system. "As a 
result, the flexibility of the balance of power, and, with 
it, its restraining influence upon the power aspirations of 
the main protagonists on the international scene have 
disappeared."9 Morgenthau noted, "This reduction in the 
number of nations that are able to play a major role in 
international politics has had a deteriorating effect on the 
operation of the balance of power."10
One aspect of the classical system Morgenthau felt was 
missing from the new system was that of the "balancer," a 
role frequently ascribed to Great Britain in continental 
European affairs during the 18th and 19th centuries. Even 
Europe could not play this role between the United States 
and the Soviet Union in the period after 1945 because it was 
at once both the battlefield and the prize of victory.
"They [European states] are permanently interested in the 
victory of one or the other side."11
8Ibid., p. 390.
’Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations; The
Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1967), p. 336.
10Ibid. , p. 334.
nIbid., p. 340.
8One benefit Morgenthau saw in multipolarity was its
complexity, and the obstacle it presented to any one state
mastering a given situation. He wrote, "The greater the
number of active players, the greater the number of possible
combinations and the greater also the uncertainty as to the
combinations that will actually oppose each other and as to
the role individual players will actually perform in
them."12 But this uncertainty, cited by Morgenthau as being
helpful, was noted by Richard Rosecrance as making foreign
policy more difficult, and outcomes less predictable:
Multipolarity, then, raises the difficulty of 
policy-making. Results may be altogether unfore­
seen; choice becomes very complex. Since multi­
polarity raises incalculability, the system finds 
it more difficult to achieve stable results. War 
may occur, not through a failure of will, but 
through a failure of comprehension.13
While Haas and Levy purported to show the relative 
stability of bipolar systems empirically, Kenneth Waltz 
actually sought to explain this phenomenon. Like DePorte, 
Waltz*s admiration for the bipolar system was based primari­
ly on the unchanging distribution of power in Europe during 
the postwar period. He proffered several reasons why this 
system might lead to more stability than the classical 
multipolar system. One reason was the presence of a clearly 
superior power within each alliance system. "As Machiavelli
12Ibid. , p. 335.
13R. N. Rosecrance, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity and the 
Future," Journal of Conflict Resolution. Volume 10, 1966, p. 
320.
9and Bismarck well knew, an alliance system requires an 
alliance leader; and leadership can most easily be main- 
tained where the leader is superior in power."14 With two 
superpowers, Waltz wrote, there were no peripheries; 
bipolar division was capable of transforming almost every 
conflict worldwide. Waltz also believed that competition 
expanded in such a system to include non-military factors; 
the economy became an important indicator of ability to 
sustain power, as was domestic support. There was an un­
willingness to accept even small territorial losses to the 
other side. The constant presence of pressure to guard 
against any gain of advantage by potential opponents, de­
scribed by Waltz as inherent in a bipolar system, was, 
contrarily, lauded by Morgenthau as a trait in a multipolar 
balance of power. According to Waltz, threats were worth 
turning into crises if they served to prevent war later. 
"Admittedly, cases also occur in a multipolar world, but the 
dangers are diffused, responsibilities unclear and the 
definition of vital interests easily obscured."15
If Waltz is correct, therefore, the remarkable stabili­
ty of the division of Europe from 1949 until 1989 therefore 
may have had dimension other than that recognized by 
DePorte. Rather than just being a fortuitous period during
l4Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World,"
Daedalus, Volume 93, 1964, p. 881.
15Ibid. , p. 884.
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which Germany was divided between two superpowers, it may 
have been an era when the whole world enjoyed the relative 
benefits of bipolarity.
According to DePorte, the main problem facing the 
multi-polar European balance of power after 1871 was the 
presence of uncontainable German power. If this, and not 
the multipolar distribution of power itself, was the main 
threat to relative peace and stability, then it is surpris­
ing in retrospect that such a system could have been allowed 
to collapse in 1989 without more effort being made to 
contain what had been the system*s primary threat all along. 
However, the lesson of the Cold War might be, instead, that 
a bipolar system is better able to hold in check opposing 
forces than is the classical multipolar balance of power.
One way to test this proposition is to review the role 
which German-Soviet relations played in two periods of 
recent history, one in which the balance of power was 
multipolar, and on in which it was bipolar. Relations 
between the Soviet Union and Germany during the entire 
Soviet period resulted in several episodes that had implica­
tions for the whole continent and the international system. 
Each of these episodes was approached by the Soviet and 
German statesmen with more than the minimal amounts of 
national ambition, creativity, flexibility and a healthy 
sense of state survival. Yet how these episodes played out 
is strikingly different across systems, and the sum of them
11
lends credence to those who argue that bipolar systems are 
more stable than multipolar ones. Three of the most impor­
tant episodes during the period before the Second World War, 
when the state system was multipolar, demonstrated the 
inability of the system to maintain the status quo. Con­
versely, three episodes during the Cold War, initiated for 
the purpose of undermining the position of the other side of 
the bipolar split, instead led to a more abiding dedication 
to that split and its agreed parameters.
Morgenthau cited uncertainty as a restraining influence 
characteristic of a multipolar system. Rosecrance found 
this uncertainty led to unintended consequences. Waltz said 
that in crises under such circumstances dangers appear 
diffused, responsibilities unclear, and vital interests 
obscured. The course of negotiation, posturing, decision­
making and risk-calculation surrounding the decision of 
Germany and the Soviet Union to cooperate at three crucial 
points from the end of the First World War to the beginning 
of the Second reveals the characteristics of multipolarity. 
The examples were the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Rapallo 
and the Molotov-von Rippentrop Pact. The results were the 
unintended consequences cited by Rosecrance and the obscured 
vital interests cited by Waltz.
Waltz similarly delineated the characteristics of a 
bipolar system. Lesser powers would be led unavoidably to 
follow of the leader of their respective alliance. There
12
would be no real peripheries; every venue could be an 
opportunity for bipolar conflict. The levels of competition 
would increase to include regime legitimacy and economic 
performance. There would be an unwillingness to accept even 
small territorial losses, and the tendency would be to allow 
threats turn into crises. These factors cited by Waltz, 
characterized German (both East and West) and Soviet actions 
during the Cold War in response to attempts to alter the 
status quo. They are found in the reactions to the Stalin 
Note of Mach 10, 1952, the Second Berlin Crisis, and Willy 
Brandt1s Ostpo1it ik.
PART ONE
THE INTERWAR PERIOD
There were no two countries on the European continent 
with more reason to fear and distrust each other on ideolog­
ical grounds during the interwar period than Germany and 
Soviet Russia. Germany during this period was led by 
military and industrial elites, under aristocratic, then 
bourgeois-republican, and finally, mass-movement fascist 
guises. Tsarist Russia fell into the hands of the Bolshe­
viks who nationalized Russia's industry, politicized a 
rebuilt military, and proclaimed the coming of an interna­
tional, anti-imperialist revolution of the proletariat.
Despite the rather severe incompatibility between the 
world views and ultimate objectives of the leaders of these 
two countries, the dictates of realpolitik necessitated that 
at key junctures from the latter days of the First World War 
to the opening salvos of the Second, German and Soviet 
leaders put aside ideological animosity and struck deals 
with each other to the disadvantage of the leading Western 
European powers— Britain and France. These examples of 
cooperation had very serious consequences for the multi­
polar balance of power.
13
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Of these arrangements, those embodied in the Treaty of 
Brest-Litovsk, the Rapallo Treaty, and the Molotov-von 
Rippentrop Pact signalled the greatest threats to interna­
tional stability.
CHAPTER I
BREST-LITOVSK
Before the First World War had concluded its third 
year, Tsarist Russia's internal political structure col­
lapsed and the three-hundred year reign of the Romanov 
dynasty came to an abrupt end. Relying on the continuity of 
the few popular, non-aristocratic structures the Empire 
possessed, a provisional government was formed from the 
ranks of the Duma in March 1917, and the new government 
tried to pursue the war against the Central Powers to a 
victorious conclusion.
V.I. Lenin returned from his Swiss exile in April.
Upon arrival in Petrograd he called for the overthrow of the 
Provisional Government and the granting of all power to the 
workers' soviets, where the power of the Bolsheviks was 
greatest. With the army in full retreat in the face of 
German advances along the entire front, the Bolsheviks saw 
their opportunity in October and seized control of the 
government. They promised the war-weary population that a 
Bolshevik coup would result in further workers' revolts 
abroad and a just, painless peace. According to Kennan,
"The principal significance (of the coup) was seen by its 
authors to lie in its quality as a prelude to that collapse
15
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of all European imperialism in which they were primarily 
interested.1,16 But the revolution in Petrograd and Moscow 
did not immediately result in workers* revolts in the 
capitals of the other warring parties. This made the 
position of the fledgling Bolshevik regime extremely diffi­
cult. Having promised the populace peace in exchange for 
power, the Bolsheviks risked going the way of the provision­
al government if they too tried to keep Russia in the 
disastrous conflict. But worse than that, staying in the 
war was not only not a viable political option, it was no 
longer even a military one. The disintegration of the 
Russian Army had been deliberately encouraged and pursued by 
the Bolsheviks as part of their strategy for gaining pow­
er,17 for it demonstrated at once the hopelessness of the 
counterrevolutionary cause and the power the masses could 
wield by refusing to obey orders. It also destroyed the 
most potent weapon the government might have used against 
the Bolshevik insurgency. But the price to be paid— inher­
iting a nation almost completely undefended against a 
powerful invader— was onerous. The Bolsheviks had no choice 
but to sue for peace and hope for the best.
The Germans immediately sensed that Russia*s necessary 
withdrawal from the war could not have come at a better time
16George F. Kennan, Soviet Foreign Policy. 1917-1941
(Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1960), p. 12.
17Ibid.
17
for them. Army Commander Erich Ludendorff had already 
decided to seek the conclusion of the war on the Western 
Front before American troops could arrive on the battle­
fields in great numbers. To accomplish this, he wished to 
transfer most of the German Army in Russia to the Western 
Front.18 Besides augmenting the forces in the west required 
to balance the recent addition of America to the Western 
Allies, Germany also needed a quick conclusion to the war in 
order to meet the needs of its malnourished, war-weary 
population. Not only would the Russian withdrawal bring 
victory nearer in the military sense, but the prospect of 
foodstuffs coming from the Russian steppes brought hope that 
the German population would receive the sustenance necessary 
for the final push. For this reason, as well as the desire 
to contain Bolshevism and promote Germany's imperial de­
signs, Germany also sought the "liberation" of some of the 
Russian Empire's non-Russian provinces.
So while the Soviet government called on all the 
warring countries to conclude a general armistice, German 
Chancellor Hertling spoke to the Reichstag on November 28, 
1917, of Germany's intention to safeguard the "right to 
self-determination" for the peoples of Poland, Courland and 
Lithuania. Couched in almost Wilsonian terms, this declara­
tion was a tactical maneuver to detach these areas from
l8Winfried Baumgart, Deutsche Ostpolitk 1918: Von Brest- 
Litowsk bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges (Vienna: R.
Oldenbourg Verlag, 1966), p. 14.
18
Russia and attach them to Germany. Poland had already been 
recognized by decrees of the Kaiser on November 5, 1916, and 
Lithuania and Courland were more or less under German 
control by the fall of 1917.19
The Soviet government had no choice but to negotiate. 
According to historian Wheeler-Bennett: "The whim of
history willed that the representatives of the most revolu­
tionary regime ever known should sit at the same diplomatic 
table with representatives of the most reactionary military 
caste among all ruling classes."20 The stage was set for a 
series of negotiations which carried enormous risks for the 
involved parties, more so for the Bolsheviks, but promised 
mutual advantage. The lure of the immediate advantage 
promised was great enough to transcend considerations of 
ideology and long-term objectives.
The negotiations proceeded in four phases, with the 
Soviet position becoming more desperate at each stage.21 In 
late December 1917 an armistice was signed and the two sides 
began to discuss the terms of a peace treaty. Hoping still 
that propaganda from the conference table would spark 
revolution in Germany and Western Europe, the Bolsheviks 
brashly proposed a general peace with no annexations, no
19Ibid. , p. 15.
20Richard F. Rosser, An Introduction to Soviet Foreign 
Policy (Englewood Cliff, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1969) p. 96.
21Ibid. , p. 97.
19
indemnities, and self-determination of peoples. The Germans 
announced that they would agree if the Allies would also 
agree, which they would not. Then the Germans explained 
that the former tsarist provinces were exercising self- 
determination by choosing independence with the status of 
German protectorates.22
At this point the Bolsheviks began to appreciate how 
fraught with dangers was the option they had no choice but 
to pursue— negotiated peace with the Germans. Continuing 
the armed conflict was neither a political nor military 
possibility, but the peace with Germany might be so unac­
ceptable to the Bolsheviks politically that its acceptance 
could lead to their overthrow. The Bolsheviks could not be 
spared this danger unless the peace were to become a general 
one, embracing all the parties, or a revolution were to 
occur in Germany to redirect that country's foreign and 
military policies radically.23 Although these occurrences 
were not quite at hand, the Bolsheviks believed them to be 
imminent. Therefore, having signed an armistice with the 
Germans which ended their advance into Russia, the Bolshe­
viks now saw their interest in delaying a peace treaty and 
waiting for historical forces to rescue them.
To pursue this policy of intentional delay, the Bolshe­
viks sent Leon Trotsky to lead the Soviet negotiators at
22Ibid. , p. 97.
^Kennan, p. 12.
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Brest-Litovsk. This phase began on January 9, 1918.
Trotsky began his filibuster with revolutionary predictions, 
propaganda, and attempts to draw the German negotiators into 
philosophical, ideological, and legalistic discussions. The 
Germans brought this circus to an end on January 18 when 
representatives of the Rada, the governing body of Ukraine's 
recently declared independent republic, arrived. The 
Germans announced that they would negotiate with the Bolshe­
viks over a treaty covering the front north of Brest, but 
they would negotiate with the Rada over the future of Russia 
south of Brest.24 The hollowness of Trotsky's strategy 
became readily apparent. He allowed the delegation to be 
recalled to Petrograd for consultations.
Among the Bolsheviks at this point were three factions. 
The left faction, led by Bukharin, argued that political 
costs made peace with the Germans prohibitive. It would 
give a victory to imperialists and mark the Bolsheviks as 
traitors to the Russian nation; it was completely out of the 
question. Bukharin argued for the Bolsheviks to launch a 
"revolutionary war" immediately against European imperial­
ism. Fearing the German occupation of Petrograd that would 
certainly result from this foolhardy but romantic proposal, 
Lenin urged the immediate signing of a peace treaty to give 
the new regime "breathing space." Trotsky, finding 
Bukharin's proposal unrealistic and Lenin's unacceptable,
^Rosser, p. 98.
21
proposed that the Bolsheviks unilaterally declare that they 
would neither wage war with the Germans not sign a peace 
treaty with them.25 Since it seemed less dangerous than 
resuming the war effort, Lenin agreed to back Trotsky's 
plan. On February 8, the Germans signed a separate peace 
with the Rada representatives, but the Bolsheviks drove the 
Rada out of Kiev the same day. On February 10, Trotsky 
announced that there would be no war and no peace with the 
Germans. At first confused by the meaning of Trotsky's 
declaration, the Germans announced on February 16 that they 
would resume their advance in two days.26
Russia's ability to show any organized resistance to 
the new German advance along the entire front was as nonex­
istent as Lenin had feared, and on February 21 the Germans 
announced harsher terms. The Bolsheviks made inquiries as 
to what aid they might receive from Britain and France if 
they chose to resume the war. Bukharin strenuously objected 
to receiving any help from the imperialist West. Lenin re­
sponded to such concerns, "Please add my vote to those in 
favor of receiving food and weapons from the Anglo-French 
imperialist robbers."27 On February 23, seven voted with 
Lenin in the Bolshevik central committee to sign a treaty
^Ibid., pp. 98-99.
26Ibid. , p. 99.
^Adam Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign
Policy 1917-1973 (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc. 1974),
p. 68.
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with the Germans. Four supported Bukharin's proposal to 
fight on. Four, including Trotsky, abstained.28 Talks 
resumed on February 27 and treaty was signed March 3. Under 
the terms of the treaty, the Bolsheviks agreed to the 
separation from Russia of the Ukraine, Poland, the Baltic 
provinces, Finland, and the Transcaucusus. For the most 
part, the German Empire was to have decided the relative 
level of self-determination of each of these areas.
The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was a short-lived agree­
ment. It was renounced by the Soviets immediately after 
Germany signed an armistice on the Western Front on November 
11, 1918, but the example it set was profound and the 
effects lasting. This treaty between German military 
leaders and Bolshevik revolutionaries might have cost the 
Allies victory in the First World War, but whilst less 
damaging than that, it made the task of creating a stable 
world order on the foundations of a multipolar balance of 
power after the war much more difficult. Victory in the 
East, and the near victory in the West that almost occurred 
as a result in the summer of 1918, gave life to the conten­
tion that the German Army, which had not really suffered 
defeat in the field, had been stabbed in the back by coward­
ly Social Democrats in Berlin. This notion played a crucial 
role in fanning the flames of German revanchism in the 1920s 
and 1930s. As a result, Germany would pay lip service at
28Rosser, p. 100.
23
times to the Versailles Treaty but would never really adhere 
to its letter or spirit.
For the West, the Bolsheviks were threatening because 
of their treachery; they had destroyed Russia as a fighting 
force against Germany and allowed the transfer of German 
troop strength to the West. Moreover, they had repudiated 
tsarist debts and nationalized foreign investments, which 
continued to be a major source of friction after the war. 
Bolshevism also represented a major ideological threat to 
industrialized countries because of its appeal to class 
warfare. For these reasons, the Allies and Associated 
Powers sent troops to occupy Russian ports and meddled 
extensively in the bloody Russian civil war of 1918-1921.
The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk demonstrated that, absent 
American help, Britain and France might deal successfully 
with either Germany or Soviet Russia but could not handle 
both. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk frustrated Allied desires 
for a friendly Russia without Bolsheviks and for an unambig­
uous German defeat. The lack of solid relations with Russia 
made the efforts of Britain and France to contain German 
power on a long-term basis extremely difficult.
CHAPTER II
THE RAPALLO TREATY
The Rapallo Treaty of 1922 was one of the most signifi­
cant steps in the foreign policies of the Weimar Republic 
and Soviet Russia in the interwar period. It was a response 
to the failure of the Great Powers to harmonize their inter­
ests, and it represented a major blow to the ultimate 
ability of the Entente to contain the revisionist aims of 
the Bolsheviks and Germany, and thus guarantee the peace of 
Versailles.
The Rapallo Treaty of 1922 was a by-product of the 
Genoa Conference which was convened to deal with the reinte­
gration of Russia into international trade and to bring 
Germany in as a junior partner in the economic reconstruc­
tion of Europe. The European powers failed to prevent the 
Bolsheviks from establishing power but were successful in 
their efforts to contain the spread of revolution. They 
sought to take advantage of changes inside the Soviet Union 
and the consequent willingness of the Bolsheviks to seek an 
accommodation with the capitalist powers for the sake of the 
aid, trade, and investments necessary to revive the Russian 
economy. Germany sought to participate in the general 
effort to reinvigorate the world economy and, by demonstrat-
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ing that the reparations burden placed on Germany at Ver­
sailles was inimical to this goal, to achieve a substantial 
reduction in that burden. The Bolsheviks were not willing, 
however, to endanger the political gains of the revolution 
by becoming the passive object of European imperialism. Nor 
was Germany willing to help the Entente strengthen its 
directing role in the international system unless it could 
demonstrate that the increased ability to protect German 
interests would be the quid pro quo for cooperation.
The Genoa Conference had its immediate origins in the 
Brussels Conference of October 6-8, 1921, at which 
twenty-one nations, including Germany but excluding Russia, 
met to discuss the Soviet request for famine relief and a 
resumption of economic relations with the capitalist world. 
The decision made at Brussels and conveyed to the Soviet 
leadership expressed a willingness to provide famine relief 
to Russia, but it would be linked to political and economic 
obligations: the Bolsheviks would have to recognize the
debts of tsarist Russia and would have to establish a regime 
under which future credits would be secure.29
The reply of Soviet Foreign Minister Chicherin came on 
October 28: Russia would expect substantial aid and invest­
ments if it agreed to the terms; it required a cessation of 
intervention against the regime and de jure diplomatic
29Carole Fink, The Genoa Conference: European Diplomacy.
1921-1922 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina
Press, 1924), pp. 5-6.
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recognition; and there would have to be an international 
conference to mediate the financial claims of the involved 
parties.30 This reply was the climax of several important 
events in Russia in 1921. The first was the defeat of the 
forces of counterrevolution and the end of foreign interven­
tion. This was followed by a switch from war communism to 
the New Economic Policy (NEP) and the consolidation of 
government political, and financial institutions. By then 
the Soviets had also begun to direct the forces of world 
proletarian revolution through the Communist International, 
which would have the effect of enabling the Soviet state to 
change the role of Communist parties from agents of domestic 
revolution to surrogates acting in defense of Soviet Russia.
These developments represented a shift by the Bolshe­
viks away from the immediate overthrow of international 
capitalism to protecting the Soviet security interests, 
first by rebuilding the Russian economy and then preventing 
action against the USSR by a united front of the imperialist 
powers. These changes resulted from an altered Soviet view 
of the imminence of world revolution and the success of war 
communism as a stop-gap measure. The earlier optimism about 
world revolution was dashed by the failure of the revolu­
tionary war in Poland, the fizzling of the expected revolu­
tion in Germany, and the threat posed in the 1921 Kronstadt 
uprising when the sailors of the great Russian naval base
^Ibid., p. 6.
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demanded political freedom for all socialist and anarchist 
parties.31 By 1921 Russia was interested in reaching an 
accommodation with the capitalists in order to obtain the 
capital necessary to build the economy, to gain internation­
al recognition for the regime, and to build relationships 
that would allow the Bolsheviks to exploit capitalist 
contradictions and play one power off against another.
The Weimar Republic at this time was facing a severe 
economic, and therefore political, crisis because it was 
unable to meet the demanding reparations schedule set by the 
conditions of the Treaty of Versailles. When the Allies, 
through the London Ultimatum of May 1921, put pressure on 
Germany to step up its efforts to meet its payments, the 
German cabinet resigned rather than comply with the demands. 
President Ebert called on Dr. Wirth, a member of the left- 
wing of the Catholic Center Party, a strong nationalist with 
the confidence of the German People’s Party, to form a new 
government. Wirth was an advocate of "Erfullungspolitik," 
or policy of fulfillment, which had as its goal showing 
ostentatious compliance with Entente demands in hopes of 
undermining the will of the Entente to continue imposing the 
reparations. By demonstrating Germany's good faith and 
exposing the crippling effects of reparations, it was 
argued, the Entente could be split. For domestic political 
reasons, France continued to insist that the reparation
31Ibid.
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demands were too lenient, while Britain, the United States 
and the neutrals found them exorbitant. Furthermore,
Britain recognized that the demands were inhibiting a 
revival of the world economy. If the Entente could be split 
and made unable to agree on policy with regard to Germany, 
Germany could hope to escape paying most of the reparations 
while avoiding assaults on its territorial integrity.32
There were, therefore, general trends leading both the 
Weimar Republic and Soviet Russia to seek accommodations 
with the Entente, but other events showed that neither of 
their respective national interests would be secured by 
one-sided agreements imposed by the "have" powers against 
the "have-nots". This mutual realization laid the ground­
work for a German-Soviet rapprochement at the expense of the 
victors of Versailles.
The Soviets feared that they would be faced with a 
united front of capitalist nations at Genoa that would force 
the Bolsheviks to recognize tsarist debts. They were even 
more fearful of an idea advanced by Germany Foreign Minis­
ter, Walter Rathenau, that the Western powers should estab­
lish a joint international consortium for the purpose of 
trading with and investing in Soviet Russia. Such a monopo­
ly would eliminate competition among the capitalist powers 
for concessions from the Soviets and would turn Soviet 
Russia into a semi-colonial object for exploitation by
32Ibid. , p. 15.
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Western capitalists.33 To the Bolsheviks, the power roost 
likely to want to see a major upheaval against the status 
quo as laid down in the Treaty of Versailles, was Germany, 
which became the obvious target of any concerted Soviet 
effort to break the united front of capitalist powers. 
According to Gustav Hilger, throughout the efforts during 
1921 to establish normal diplomatic relations, the Soviet 
leaders urged the German policy makers to "answer French and 
English intransigence and hypocrisy by establishing a 
friendship of the two major underprivileged nations." But, 
he said, in the long run the Bolsheviks* threats were 
probably more effective than their cajoling.34
In Pravda, on December 27, 1921, Bolshevik columnist 
Karl Radek hinted broadly that the USSR could always adhere 
to the Versailles Treaty and thereby collect reparations 
from Germany under the provisions of Article 116, which had 
to do with the circumstances under which Russia could seek 
reparations. He assured Germans in private conversations, 
however, that Soviet Russia would like to avoid this if at 
all possible. But an article in Izvestiva on February 5, 
1922, stepped up the pressure by hinting that Soviet Russia 
held the fate of the German bourgeoisie in its hands. All 
Soviet Russia needed to do, the article said, was join with
33Gustav Hilger and Alfred G. Meyer, The Incompatible 
Allies; A Memoir-Historv of German-Soviet Relations 1918-1941
(New York: The MacMillan Company, 1953), p. 75.
MIbid.
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the Entente in implementing Article 116, which could be a 
means of sparking proletarian revolution in Germany because 
the resulting impoverishment of the Weimar Republic would 
intensify class conflict. The Soviets should not be senti­
mental about the fate of the German bourgeoisie, it was 
argued, because the policies of the Weimar Republic suggest­
ed that it was siding with the forces of international 
capitalism against Soviet Russia. Izvestiva added a note to 
the bottom of the published article emphasizing that it did 
not agree with the view of the author.35
Germany had once before recognized that in some areas 
its interests coincided more with the Bolsheviks than with 
the Entente when Germany maintained its neutrality in the 
Soviet-Polish War of 192 0. By denying the transfer of 
French munitions across Germany to Poland, it had shown its 
unwillingness to assist Entente policies when it perceived 
them to be inimical to German or German-Soviet interests. 
This policy assisted the development of German-Soviet rela­
tions in that it demonstrated the readiness of Germany to 
look East when the West was unhelpful; it enhanced the 
Soviet's recognition of the importance of Germany to the 
breakup of the united front; it showed the inability of the 
Entente to enact its policies in Eastern Europe over German 
objections; and it demonstrated the inability of the Entente 
to keep Germany under control.
35Ibid. , p. 76.
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Germany's approach to Soviet Russia did not come about 
until the fall of 1921 when Erfullungspolitik was dealt a 
severe blow by the West's handling of the plebiscite held by 
the League Council on March 20, 1921 to determine whether 
Upper Silesia should be part of Germany or Poland. Although 
a great majority had voted for union with Germany over 
Poland, the rules of the game were altered by the League 
Council after the fact so that Germany could keep much of 
the population of Upper Silesia, but Poland was granted much 
of the industrial and mining wealth of the region. There 
followed another crisis in the German cabinet in which Wirth 
dismissed his anti-Russian Foreign Minister Friedrich Rosen 
and recalled the pro-Russian Baron Ago von Maltzen from 
Athens, where Rosen had exiled him, to head the Eastern 
Department in the Foreign Ministry.36 According to Hilger, 
the German press correctly interpreted the changes as 
evidence that the government was considering moves toward 
establishing relations with Soviet Russia.37
Even the advocates of Ostpolitik38 within the Foreign
36Stephen White, The Origins of Detente: The Genoa
Conference and Western-Soviet Relations, 1921-1922 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 151.
37Hilger and Meyer, p. 74.
38The term "Ostpolitik," while familiar to most for its 
association with Willy Brandt's foreign policy initiatives, 
dates at least to the Weimar era. Literally "eastern policy," 
it is usually used to indicate a German foreign policy 
orientation seeking Germany's vital interests in the East 
through political, economic and cultural initiatives. Konrad 
Adenauer, alternatively, was an advocate of "Westpolitik" even
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Ministry hastened to warn against moving too hastily toward 
an agreement with Russia that would benefit only the Soviets 
by hurting Germany regarding reparations to the Entente.
But, on the other hand, they argued Germany should not 
permit itself to be abused by the Entente if it chose 
economic collaboration with the Soviets. And they feared 
that after a year of the NEP, the Bolsheviks were anxious to 
conclude a trade deal with the capitalist countries and 
would not hesitate to use Article 116 if it were a means of 
securing such trade.39 As the Genoa conference approached, 
Germany began to believe in a worst case scenario in which 
the Soviets would acknowledge debts to France, but insist on 
paying for them out of reparations owed to Russia by Germany 
under Article 116.
En route to Genoa, Soviet Foreign Minister Georgii 
Vasil'evich Chicherin stopped in Berlin. His purpose was to 
try to convince Germany to sign an agreement renouncing any 
outstanding debts and establishing diplomatic relations. 
France had given the Germans an inducement to accept the 
Soviet offer by publicly floating the idea that if the 
Bolsheviks were to accept responsibility for Tsarist debts,
in the Weimar era. In the table of contents of Deutsche 
Aussenoolitik in der Ara der Weimarer Reoublik by Ludwig 
Zimmermann, published by the Musterschmidt-Verlag of Gottingen 
in 1958, a corresponding chapter subheading is called "Der 
Rapallovertrag und die Grundprobleme der deutschen 
Ostpolitik." A later chapter is entitled, "Ostpolitik nach 
Locarno."
39Ibid. , p. 77.
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France would support Russia's application under Article 116 
of the Treaty of Versailles to receive reparations from 
Germany. Fortunately for the Germans, the Bolsheviks had no 
interest in accepting the Tsar's debts, no matter the 
incentive, but in Berlin before the conference they let the 
Germans believe that they were on the point of signing an 
agreement with France.
Notwithstanding this pressure from the Soviets, Germany 
hesitated. It feared that signing a separate agreement with 
the Soviets might spark Allied anger and retribution just as 
Erfuellungspolitik might be paying dividends. Even though 
France had already foreclosed the discussion of the repara­
tions, the British might still reopen the question to 
Germany's advantage, particularly if Germany proved useful 
in negotiating with the Soviets as part of a united capital­
ist front. Regardless of last-minute illusions of what the 
conference in Genoa might hold for a desperate German 
Republic, one scholar of Chicherin's career has noted:
George Vasil'evich did not travel to Italy with 
nothing to show for his efforts. The talks in 
Berlin demonstrated how close the two governments 
were to an agreement, as they had developed a 
draft treaty that could be used at the Genoa 
conference. And the Germans had consented to 
maintain close contact with the Soviets at Gen-
^ i m o t h y  Edward O'Connor, Diplomacy and Revolution: G.V.
Chicherin and Soviet Foreign Affairs. 1918-1930 (Iowa State 
University Press, 1988), p. 88.
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The first week of the Genoa conference, April 10 to 14, 
quickly resulted in an impasse. In response to the demands 
for recognition of tsarist debts, Chicherin presented a 
counterclaim for damages to Russia caused by the Entente 
intervention which prolonged the Civil War. The figure 
Chicherin presented to the Entente far exceeded the value of 
the investments they wished to recoup.
Germany had little success getting any of the powers to 
discuss the reparations issue. Indeed, the German delegates 
felt entirely left out of the discussions and were excluded 
from some of the semi-official conversations between the 
Soviets and the Entente. They began to fear a deal being 
struck at Germany's expense.
Over the weekend, the German delegates were invited to 
the Hotel Imperial near Rapallo, where the Soviet delegation 
was staying, to discuss the treaty which had nearly been 
signed in Berlin. After some minor revisions, it was signed 
on Easter Sunday, April 16, 1922.
In the Treaty of Rapallo, both Germany and Russia 
renounced any claims against the other relating to repara­
tions from the war. This effectively removed the threat of 
Article 116. Second, Germany waived its claims to credits 
extended to the tsarist government and recognized the 
nationalization of the property of German citizens, although 
it retained the right to review these claims should Russia 
satisfy the claims of other powers. Not only did this
35
establish a break in the capitalists' united front regarding 
the Soviet's past debts, it also made it unlikely that the 
Soviets would recognize such claims by other powers. Third, 
the treaty established diplomatic relations between the 
Weimar Republic and the Soviet regime, and Germany promised 
that German contact with Russian counterrevolutionary White 
missions in Berlin would cease. Fourth, the treaty set up 
most-favored nation trading status between Weimar Germany 
and Bolshevik Russia. And last, the German government 
pledged to promote trade and investments actively in Soviet 
Russia.
The press conference on Monday morning, August 17, an­
nouncing the weekend's developments had a devastating effect 
on the Genoa conference. Although Lloyd George, the British 
P.M., had long before predicted that harshness toward 
Germany would lead it to seek friendship from Bolshevik 
Russia, such warnings had been dismissed by Clemenceau as an 
attempt to placate Germany at France's expense.41 Now that 
the treaty had been signed, France declared it to be in 
violation of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles and 
illegal under international law. Others felt that Germany's 
action violated the spirit of international cooperation, and 
particularly the spirit in which Germany had been included 
at Genoa. Although under pressure to disavow the treaty, 
Germany defended it as a step toward international reconcil-
41Ibid.
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iation and expressed its willingness to place the treaty 
within the framework of any general international agreement 
worked out at Genoa. In the event, however, Germany was 
excluded from the rest of the conference.
One of the charges against the Russo-German treaty at 
Genoa was that it contained secret military clauses, which 
both Germany and Russia vigorously denied. No such secret 
written understanding between the Weimar Republic and Soviet 
Russia regarding military matters has ever been traced, but 
the signing of the treaty did help the German military to 
reach a full understanding with the Bolsheviks on the basis 
of negotiations (independent of the Weimar government) that 
had been going on since at least 1921. This military 
relationship provided the Reichswehr with bases in Soviet 
Russia where it could try out advanced techniques and 
weapons prohibited at Versailles. Second, arms factories 
were established by the German military from which half the 
output went to the Red Army, and there was an exchange of 
technical military plans and instructors between the 
Reichswehr and the Red Army. Because of this clandestine 
relationship between the German and Soviet military estab­
lishments, Germany was able to revive its military strength 
and circumvent the Versailles restrictions while the Soviets 
gained access to a sophisticated armaments industry.42
42Ulam, p. 152.
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The short-term results of Rapallo were more important 
for their political and military than their economic impli­
cations. Although Soviet trade with Germany increased 
steadily, it never reached the volumes of the prewar years. 
Germany's inability to pay reparations led French and 
Belgian troops to occupy the Ruhr in 192 3, but Germany had 
sent a signal to the Entente at Rapallo that it had other 
options than just buckling under to Western pressure.
During Streseman's leadership of the Weimar Republic in the 
mid-1920s, the reparations were made more manageable by the 
Allies, the German economy recovered for a while. Germany 
signed the Locarno Treaty, and it joined the League of 
Nations. While developing secure relations with the En­
tente, however, Germany also continued to turn eastward, 
cultivating trade and military relationships with the Soviet 
regime.
The German Ambassador in Moscow, Count Ulrich von 
Brockdorff-Rantzau used the terms "spirit of Rapallo" and 
"community of fate" to describe German-Soviet relations 
after 1922. He shared Chicherin's view that as vanquished 
nations the two countries had to cooperate to prevent 
political domination by the victors of the war.43
The Soviets were considered the major victors for their 
ability to hold their own diplomatically. The deal with 
Germany provided the basis for trade agreements and official
430'Connor, p. 95.
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diplomatic recognition from other European countries, though 
relations continued to be shaky. Adam Ulam wrote that the 
Treaty of Rapallo was "the most important formal step in 
Soviet policy between Brest-Litovsk and the Molotov- 
Rippentrop Agreement of 1939.,|44
Rapallo was the first step toward overturning the order 
set up at Versailles. The treaty broke the diplomatic and 
economic isolation with which Bolshevism had been faced, 
making it possible for Soviet Russia to deal with capitalist 
countries separately, and to try to play them off against 
one another. More importantly, it facilitated a Soviet 
relationship with Weimar Germany that allowed Germany to 
rebuild its military strength and escape some of the re­
strictions of the Versailles settlement. The obvious 
ultimate object of this alliance was to weaken Poland, which 
was France's principal instrument for containing both 
Germany and Soviet Russia.
Bolshevism was the mortal enemy of both Imperial and 
Nazi Germany and posed the greatest internal threat to the 
Weimar Republic almost until its collapse, yet both Germany 
and Soviet Russia found that their opposition to the Europe­
an status quo allowed them to risk working together.
Because the system was multipolar, Germany and Soviet Russia 
could not be stopped from playing a part in the balance of 
power. There was considerable uncertainty on the part of
"Ibid., p. 149.
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Germany at Genoa as to what Britain and France would allow. 
And because both Germany and Soviet Russia wished to in­
crease power relative to the others, Britain and France were 
unable to clearly identify which would ultimately be the 
greater threat.
CHAPTER III 
THE MOLOTOV-VON RIPPENTROP PACT
The final and most famous example of German-Soviet 
cooperation, leading to devastating consequences for much of 
the world, was the agreement to divide Poland and establish 
"spheres of influence" in the rest of eastern Europe. By 
the 1930's both Germany and Soviet Russia had acquired 
leaders whose aggressive goals were logical extensions of 
the subtler attempts at subterfuge pursued by more moderate 
governments during the 1920's. For example, if, for the 
Communist movement, reality had dictated that the Bolshevik 
regime in Russia be given breathing space, legitimacy, 
protection from foreign intervention, and a chance to indus­
trialize, with foreign help if possible, then it was reason­
able for Stalin to demand that the Communist International 
relegate revolution in ‘other countries to the back burner 
whenever this was in the interest of Soviet foreign policy. 
And if "socialism in one state" was going to be the vehicle 
through which capitalism would be vanquished, then Soviet 
Russia was justified in seeking to reestablish control over 
previous imperial provinces. Rather than seek direct 
confrontation with imperialist powers, Stalin sought to 
protect the Soviets from involvement in a war while hoping
40
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that the powers to the West would engage in weakening 
fratricidal conflict.
Similarly, one might sympathize with Germany which, 
under the Weimar Republic, had continuously tried to under­
mine the terms of the Treaty of Versailles and reestablish 
itself as a great power with spheres of influence like any 
other great power. And if the right to seek a revision of 
the borders to the east had always been a legitimate Weimar 
goal, then it was no less so after the National Socialists 
out-maneuvered more traditional conservative elements and 
seized control of the state in 1933. A.J.P. Taylor conclud­
ed, "In principle and doctrine, Hitler was no more wicked 
than many other contemporary statesmen. In wicked acts he 
outdid them all."45
The British and French continued to rely on collective 
security to forestall the use of war to change international 
boundaries, but with modifications. By the 1930's many in 
the west had begun to concede that the peace imposed in 1919 
had been altogether too harsh. Tolerance grew for efforts 
by Germany to seek revisions in areas where the rights of 
German nationals had been infringed or where Germany might 
be denied the usual right to self-defense accorded any other 
state. At the same time, however, France tried to bolster 
its alliances with the objects of Germany's revisionist
45A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War 
(London: Hamish Hamilton, 1961), p. 71.
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claims to the east, especially Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
Rumania and Yugoslavia in 1935. With the latter three, 
France established a "Little Entente" calling for action 
should any party to the pact be attacked. After Germany 
occupied the Rhineland in 1936, France invested in a series 
of heavy fortifications on the German frontier as a defen­
sive measure.
Hitler's fears, as he began the process of revising 
Germany's borders to the east, were that Britain and France 
would go to war before German armed forces were strong 
enough and that the Soviets would be on the Anglo-French 
side. Under no circumstances did he want to fight France, 
Britain, and Soviet Russia at the same time. Indeed, on the 
occasion of each advance, Hitler gambled that he had manipu­
lated the situation so that war would not result.
Conversely, Stalin's greatest fear was that Britain and 
France would stay neutral while Germany launched an invasion 
to the east. This fear was heightened after Britain and 
France failed to prevent the reoccupation of the Rhineland 
and allowed German and Italian intervention to turn the tide 
in the Spanish Civil War. Knowing that all of Hitler's 
remaining known desiderata lay to the east, by the middle of 
1936 the Soviet government was already seriously concerned 
over the likely failure of collective security.46
^Kennan, p. 91.
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By supporting the Republicans in Spain and by being the 
only country offering aid to Czechoslovakia during the 
Munich Crisis, albeit under provisos that clearly could not 
be met, Stalin hoped to signal to Britain and France that 
there would be Soviet help in containing the Nazi menace.
After Germany had succeeded in changing its borders 
with Austria, Czechoslovakia and Lithuania, Hitler's atten­
tion turned next to Poland, the most formidable neighbor to 
the east. He offered to support Poland's claim to the 
Ukraine in exchange for a peaceful cession of Danzig and the 
Corridor, which Poland rejected.47 It then became necessary 
for Germany to ascertain the reactions of Britain, France 
and Soviet Russia were Poland to be invaded. Hitler be­
lieved that the British and French would go to war over 
Poland only if they could be guaranteed that the Soviets 
would also. However, since it was in the Soviets' best 
interest for Germany to fight Britain and France without 
Russia's involvement, only a direct attack on Soviet terri­
tory could have enlisted Stalin on the side of the Western 
Allies, and this would not be possible until Poland and 
Romania were under German control.48
On March 10, 1939, Stalin gave a famous address before 
the XVIIIth Communist Party Congress. Although read by some
47Ibid. , p. 96.
48James E. McSherry, Stalin, Hitler and Europe. Volume I; 
The Origins of World War II 1933-1939 (Cleveland: The World
Publishing Company, 1968), p. 230.
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to indicate a readiness to strike a deal with Germany, Ulam 
interprets the speech as an attempt to draw out the Western 
powers, citing Stalin's usual use of taunts, false expres­
sions of self-confidence, and mere insinuations of rap­
prochement with Germany. "'We don't need you, but you may 
need us; if so hurry up' is the most sensible translation of 
what Stalin was saying."49 However brave Stalin made him­
self appear, he still had no guarantee that Britain and 
France would not stand idly by while Hitler invaded Poland 
and then the Soviet Union, just as they had surrendered when 
faced with every previous Nazi demand. Weakened by Stalin's 
purges, the Red Army in 1939 was no match for the Wehrmacht.
Then on March 31, Neville Chamberlain, the British 
Prime Minister, unilaterally guaranteed that Britain would 
intervene if Poland were attacked. Ulam concluded that this 
statement made possible the whole train of events leading up 
to the conclusion of a pact between the Nazis and the 
Soviets. "On its face," he wrote, "the British Government's 
pledge guaranteed Poland; in fact, its timing and circum­
stances provided a guarantee to the U.S.S.R. and doomed the 
Polish state."50 Had the guarantee not been made, Stalin 
had no assurance that Germany's imminent invasion of Poland 
would not leave the U.S.S.R. alone as the next victim of 
Hitler's agression. With the guarantee, Stalin could rest
49Ulam, p. 263-4.
50Ibid. , p. 267.
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assured that once Poland was invaded, Britain would go to 
war, with or without the help of the Soviets. Chamberlain 
might have withheld his guarantee as a means of forcing 
Stalin into making a guarantee to Poland a necessary condi­
tion of alliance. During the subsequent months, the 
Soviets, through their diplomacy, endeavored to exact 
maximum benefits from the European crisis by negotiating 
simultaneously both with the West and with Germany.51
At first, the Soviet feigned indifference and antipathy 
toward the British guarantee, but the Germans made no 
diplomatic move toward the Soviets.52 Then the Soviets 
began negotiations with the West over guarantees to various 
eastern European states and on April 28, Hitler renounced 
the 1934 Non-Aggression Pact with Poland and the Anglo- 
German naval treaties. Stalin replaced Litvinov with 
Molotov as Soviet Foreign Minister May 3. This worked as a 
gambit to intensify interest by both Germany and the West.53 
Supposedly, Litvinov was the proponent of collective securi­
ty and Molotov, like Stalin, was a realist.
By August 1939, Hitler had decided to conclude a pact 
with Stalin, accepting his foreign minister's assurances 
that the announcement of such a pact would cause Britain and
51Louis Fischer, Russia's Road From Peace to War: Soviet
Foreign Relations 1917-1941 (New York: Harper and Row, 1969),
p. 329.
52Ulam, p. 268-9.
53Ibid. , p. 272.
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France to abandon their commitment to Poland. The Soviets 
continued negotiations with the West, attempting to deter­
mine for certain that war would break out if Germany invaded 
Poland.
Each side had a primary and a fall back position. 
Stalin*s first choice was to have Germany fight Britain and 
France, with the U.S.S.R. neutral; but since it might not be 
possible to avoid a German invasion of Russia, he needed to 
guarantee that Britain and France would participate in such 
a war as Soviet allies. Hitler desired that the West simply 
leave Poland to its fate. If this could not be accom­
plished, then he needed the neutrality of the Soviets to 
avoid a two-front war. Britain and France hoped that their 
guarantee to Poland and a Soviet alliance would dissuade 
Hitler from invading Poland. Failing this, Britain and 
France needed the Soviets as allies in a war.54
During August, Hitler was frantic for an agreement, 
because the invasion of Poland was scheduled for August 26. 
According to one witness of the Russian and German diplomat­
ic exchange, "Once the many counter arguments had been 
disposed of both went ahead with surprising enthusiasm.1,55 
When Hitler, on August 21, demanded an audience for his 
foreign minister, von Rippentrop, Stalin, not wishing to 
push Germany too far, agreed to conclude a pact on
^Ibid., pp. 271-2.
55Hilger and Meyer, p. 288.
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August 23. Secret protocols outlined the division of Poland 
and the Baltic States between German and Soviet spheres. 
Germany also recognized a Soviet "interest” in Finland and 
parts of Rumania. By this agreement Germany completed the 
revision of its borders to the east while avoiding a two- 
front war. The Soviets likewise recovered most of the 
imperial provinces lost after World War I and the subsequent 
wars and interventions. The cordon sanitaire meant to 
contain Bolshevism from the rest of Europe was completely 
removed.
Notwithstanding the new threats to the Soviets and the 
Germans that the outbreak of war brought, the cooperation 
exhibited in the Molotov-von Rippentrop Pact provided each 
party with the best possible opportunity to revise its place 
in the international order. This cooperation gave Britain 
and France the worst possible position from which to defend 
the status quo. Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia were clearly 
dangerous enemies of each other on political and ideological 
grounds, as would be borne out by the subsequent German 
invasion of the U.S.S.R. and the later Sovietization of all 
of Eastern and Central Europe, including large parts of 
Germany; yet these animosities were laid aside in 1939, as 
they were in 1918, and again in 1922.
But the opportunity to cooperate could not be ignored 
because both countries had a stake in revising international 
order. With three sides to the maneuvering, the parties
were unable to predict accurately the consequences of 
chances taken. Because the system was multipolar, no one 
side could completely trust another because of the very real 
danger of betrayal. Estimations of the effect and durabili­
ty of cooperation among one's enemies were shaky. This led 
to behavior born of miscalculation that likely would not 
have occurred under a more rigid distibution of power.
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PART TWO 
THE COLD WAR PERIOD
From the elimination of Russia as a player during the 
First World War until the outbreak of the Second, interna­
tional relations in Europe had a distinctive three-sided 
nature, continuing at crucial moments German nationalist 
revisionism and Soviet Russian revolution against Anglo- 
French attempts to maintain the status quo. By the begin­
ning of the Cold War, the German side had been eliminated 
and politics in Europe took on a distinctly two-sided 
nature. The Soviet Union's forces occupied all of Eastern 
Europe and much of the heart of the continent, guaranteeing 
friendly, nonthreatening governments to itself in each of 
the occupied lands. To meet the Soviet threat, the USA did 
not disengage from the other half of the continent. Germany 
quickly became, through its respective occupied spheres, a 
factor on both sides of the equation.
The Cold War was initially and often characterized by 
the worst outward belligerence and distrust, posing, it 
seemed, a grave threat to the peace and the future of 
humanity. Yet throughout several incidents regarding the 
future of Germany, and especially its relations with the 
Soviet Union, all sides chose the stability of the existing
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order over the uncertainty of another in which either one 
side of the other might benefit or a third side might be 
created. Among these incidents were the reactions of the 
various parties to the Stalin Note of March 10, 1952, the 
Second Berlin Crisis, 1958-1961, and the series of treaties 
resulting from Willy Brandt's "Ostpolitik," 1970-1973.
CHAPTER IV
THE STALIN NOTE
By the time the Soviet Union's note of March 10, 1952,
was issued, proposing a final settlement of the questions of
German reunification, a peace treaty, and the withdrawal of 
occupation troops, all the involved parties had made commit­
ments knowing that their policies would make the division of 
Europe into two camps a reality for the coming decades. The 
Second World War was fresh in everyone's mind and the Cold 
War was in full swing. No state was about to make any 
concessions likely to undermine its own position of securi­
ty.
The Soviet note of March 10 called for Four-Power
negotiations leading to a peace treaty with a unified
Germany. It suggested the creation of an all-German commis­
sion composed of delegates representing the two established 
German states to write a constitution for a unified Germany. 
It also conceded the right of that state to have armed 
forces necessary for its defenses, so long as Germany was 
precluded by treaty from entering an alliance directed 
against any power which had participated in the war against 
it. In a rather blatant appeal to German nationalists, the 
Soviets called for the restoration of political and civilian
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rights to all former soldiers and former Nazis not currently 
serving prison sentences.
This was not the first time a final settlement of 
German issues had been proposed. In April 1946, the United 
States had offered to conclude a Four-Power treaty on 
Germany providing for the demilitarization of Germany and 
Germany’s exclusion from alliances, but the Soviets refused. 
The Americans and British merged their zones in January 
1947. By the end of the year the Soviets were proposing the 
withdrawal of all foreign troops, but the Western Powers 
reaffirmed the need to maintain the occupation. The Soviet 
Union withdrew from the Allied Control Council, the body in 
which all decisions concerning Germany as a whole were made, 
on March 28, 1948, protesting Western discussions on Germa­
ny.
At the London Conference June 7-20, 1948, the Western 
Powers announced plans for establishing self-government in 
the three Western zones. On June 23, the Soviet and East 
European Foreign Ministers declared the London Conference to 
be in violation of the Potsdam Agreement and called for 
Four-Power action to establish an all-German government, 
demilitarization, joint control of the Ruhr, and a continua­
tion of reparations. Along with these demands, all traffic 
between the Western zones of Berlin and the Western zones of 
Germany were cut off by Russia and the Berlin Airlift began. 
There was no further serious discussion of a German settle­
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ment until 1950. On the contrary, in the meantime different
German governments were established in the Soviet and
Western zones.
For the Americans, the Soviet note of March 10, 1952,
was a particular annoyance. America had already committed
itself to the rearmament of West Germany within the context
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Soviet note
was seen as an attempt to undermine the difficult process of
getting Europeans to cooperate and rearm against the USSR.
In the words of Adam Ulam:
Had [the note of March 10] been presented in 1947 
or 1948 ... the West would have eagerly seized 
upon it as a basis for negotiations. But in 1952 
it was bound, at least in Washington, to create 
consternation and the feeling that the Russians 
were "not playing fair." Here American diplomacy 
has finally put together a plan for the defense of 
Europe and the construction of a sizable army— in 
the process overcoming American neo-isolationism, 
British apprehensions, French suspicions, and 
German touchiness— only to find the wretched 
Russians with yet another beguiling plan, again 
hinting obscurely that under certain conditions 
they just might throw their East German regime to 
the wolves.56
Too many things had happened in the recent past, from 
the American view, to make a deal with the Soviets over 
Germany possible. First of all there was the Berlin Crisis 
of 1948-1949, designed to discourage the Western Allies from 
establishing a government in their newly fused zones. From 
June 1948 to May 1949 the Soviets denied the Western allies 
road, rail, or water links to their zones in Berlin, requir­
^Ulam, p. 535.
54
ing them to supply the city by airlift. The Western powers 
were most perturbed by their weak military position in 
Western Europe, which made a more forceful response to the 
blockade unwise. Also in 1948, the Soviets participated in 
a coup d ’ 6tat against the Czechoslovak government, and the 
other "people's democracies" in Eastern Europe were trans­
formed into socialist republics. Then, in 1949, the Chinese 
Communists drove Chiang Kai-Shek and the Kuomintang off the 
Chinese mainland. These developments made American policy­
makers extremely reluctant to come to any sort of deal with 
the Soviets which might lead to a withdrawal of the American 
presence from Germany. It was the invasion of South Korea 
by the forces of the Communist North in 1950 that convinced 
the Americans that the West would have to broaden its 
available resources for the worldwide containment of Commu­
nism; therefore Germany would have to be rearmed and made 
part of the West's European forces.
In September 1950, the Western powers ended the state 
of war with the Federal Republic of Germany and pledged to 
study a means for the "participation the German Federal 
Republic in the common defense of Europe."57 What was 
required was a revision of the Occupation Statute signed 
with West Germany the year before and a means by which 
Germany could rearm without France feeling threatened. But
57Evan Luard, ed. , The Cold War: A Reappraisal (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1964), p. 26.
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America was determined to rearm Germany within the Western 
camp even if it meant that the Soviets remained in occupa­
tion of their zone and Germany was permanently divided.
France had apprehensions about any sort of German 
strength. It had, at various times, supported Soviet 
demands for severe reparations, and the detachment and 
internationalization of the Ruhr. It had favored putting 
permanent limits on Germany's industrial output and wanted 
the Saar permanently attached to France. France was opposed 
to German rearmament of any kind, even within the framework 
of the European Defense Community in which German soldiers 
would be under the direct command of the Western powers.
But France was not calling the shots. When the British 
wanted to revive the German economy to prevent their sector 
from becoming a permanent economic drain, and when America 
wanted to rearm Germans to prevent the defense of Germany 
from being a permanent drain of military resources, France 
could kick and fuss and protest but had to go along because 
it was dependent on American economic aid and needed British 
support on the Continent.
France was relieved by the new Soviet proposal because 
it gave an excuse to head off immediate proposals for German 
rearmament. But France found the Soviet proposal for 
Germany's armed neutrality very disturbing. The French 
Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, told U.S. Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson that even French Communists were embar­
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rassed by that aspect of the Soviet proposal.58 Faced with 
the prospect of Germany being rearmed, either unified or 
divided, the French were ultimately going to prefer that 
Germany be armed but divided in two opposing camps, minimiz­
ing the potential danger to France, than united and armed, 
but beholden to neither camp.
By 1952, Germany had already become important as an 
integral part of the Western economic recovery, Western 
unity, and Western defense. It was no longer possible to 
contemplate a Germany that was not closely tied to the 
West.59 The need for economic recovery in Europe had led 
the Americans and British to fuse their zones in 1946, to 
forget any idea of placing limits on Germany*s industrial 
output, and to introduce currency reform in the Western 
sectors of both Germany and Berlin in 1948 (cited by the 
Soviets as making the blockade of Berlin necessary).
European recovery and concerns about Germany * s independent 
development of industrial capacity led to extending the 
invitation to West Germany to become an associate member of 
the Council of Europe and to Schuman*s plan for a coal and 
steel pool in Western Europe in May 1950. In the wake of 
Korea, it was judged that Europe could never defend itself 
against similar Soviet aggression without a German army as
58Robert McGeehan, The German Rearmament Question: 
American Diplomacy and European Defense After Word War II 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971). p. 199.
59Ibid.
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part of the Western forces, which prompted the Western deci­
sion to revise the Occupation Statute and develop the idea 
of an integrated European Defense Community. Agreement on 
the principle of the EDC in Lisbon preceded by two weeks the 
Soviet note of March 10.
Not only did the note of March 10 not find any real 
friends in Western Europe, but despite the overt appeal of 
the note to German nationalism, it did not find much support 
in Germany either. West Germans were extremely reluctant to 
sacrifice their sovereignty for unity, and they had no 
guarantees that any unity scheme proposed by the Soviets 
would leave them with their independence. The Berlin 
Blockade, Czechoslovakia, and Korea aside as evidence of 
Soviet intentions, German democrats were concerned about 
developments within the Soviet Zone that boded ill for the 
prospect of free elections ever being held there. The 
Social Democrats in the Soviet Zone had been forced into a 
merger with the German Communist Party in 1946, resulting in 
the formation of the Socialist Unity Party (SED). Any hopes 
the Soviets had that this new party would be able to compete 
eventually in open all-German elections were dashed in the 
Berlin city elections of 1946, in which the Social Democrats 
who refused to merge won an overwhelming victory. So while 
Schumacher, the Social Democrat (SPD) leader in the West, 
favored unity and neutrality, no German democrat could have
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anything to do with the SED or a regime controlled by it in 
the East.
Even if Soviet troops were withdrawn, German democrats 
did not have any confidence that they would have been able 
to operate freely in the Soviet Zone because the SED had 
been equipped with a militarized police force that was an 
army in all but name. Indeed, it served as the basis for 
the creation of the East German army in 1956.60 So German 
democrats in the West feared that if the occupation troops
were removed, the SED would be in a position to wage civil
war. All German efforts to create a unified German state 
were therefore out of the question until free elections had 
been held in all of Germany, and this required the partici­
pation of the SPD in the Soviet Zone and the removal of the 
militarized police force from SED control.
After the Soviet Union responded to the initial Western 
plan to rearm Germany with the Prague proposals of November
1950, calling for the creation of an All-German Constituent
Council with equal numbers of representatives from the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic 
Republic, the West Germans responded with the demand for 
free elections first, in all of Germany. A UN Supervisory 
Committee— consisting of representatives from Iceland, the 
Netherlands, Pakistan, Brazil and Poland— was set up in 1951 
to supervise all-German elections, but the Polish represen-
^DePorte, p. 164.
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tatives withdrew from the effort and the committee was 
refused entry into the GDR.61
Although German nationalists criticized Konrad 
Adenauer, leader of the Christian Democrats and Chancellor 
of the Federal Republic, because his entanglement with the 
West would make the eventual reunification of Germany a 
virtual impossibility, he was able to reject all Soviet 
overtures by refusing to recognize the Oder-Neisse boundary, 
which the USSR had imposed in 1945, as the permanent border 
between Germany and Poland. Instead, Adenauer saw an 
alliance with the West as the surest means of regaining 
German sovereignty, albeit only for West Germany. He 
claimed that joining NATO and then dealing with the Russians 
from a position of strength would insure Germany's unifica­
tion in freedom. But because this policy antagonized the 
Soviets, the Christian Democrats had to accept that reunifi­
cation would not be within the range of possible options 
within the foreseeable future.
Finally, one may question how serious the Soviet Union 
itself was about its own proposal. The Soviets were 
prisoners of earlier decisions they had made with regard to 
the German question. The major decision was to have the GDR 
sign a treaty with Poland in 1950 recognizing the 
Oder-Neisse as the permanent boundary between them. This
61Donald Warr, "Germany," The Cold War: A Reappraisal.
Evan Luard, ed. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers,
1964), p. 109.
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guaranteed, on the one hand, that Poland would be dependent 
on Soviet support against German revanchism, but on the 
other guaranteed that German revanchism would be directed 
against the Soviet Union. There could have been no 
"Rapallos" with the independent, armed, unified German state 
envisioned in the March 10 note. Furthermore, the decision 
on Oder-Neisse made sure that under competitive circum­
stances, which would have to have been guaranteed in any 
All-German settlement acceptable to West Germans, the SED 
would have enjoyed no popular support in a unified Germany, 
and the Soviets would have had no internal leverage in such 
a regime. So, ultimately, even had talks progressed in 
response to the note, the Soviets would have concluded that 
they were better off with a divided Germany in which one 
part was in the Western camp and the other permanently 
dependent on the Soviet Union for its survival than with a 
neutral, armed Germany seeking to place itself in the 
Western camp at the first available opportunity.
The Soviet Union was also a prisoner of earlier deci­
sions in the sense that it had already created the SED and 
the German Democratic Republic, and could not undo them 
without an enormous loss of credibility, particularly among 
its Eastern European satellites. This explains, perhaps, 
why the Soviets could never make the one concession that the 
West would have demanded before agreeing to any all-German 
settlement: free elections. The Soviets' Prague proposal
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in 1950 had called for an equality of the FRG and the GDR. 
The West Germans could not possibly agree since it offered 
no security that negotiations would break the stalemate.
Once created, the GDR was clearly not something the Soviets 
could seriously bargain away.
The effect of the Soviet note of March 10 was to soften 
the West to the point that they had to consider further 
negotiations with the Soviets seriously, but it did not 
alter any commitments already made. It did play a role in 
the defeat of the EDC proposal, but the FRG was rearmed 
anyway as a sovereign ally in 1954. The lack of enthusias­
tic response to the Soviet note highlighted that freezing 
the status quo, rather than undermining it, might provide 
the basis for some future detente.
The Soviet note of 1952 itself was the only serious 
effort of any kind the Soviets made to try to forestall the 
rearming of Germany. Soon after Stalin died, there was a 
workers* uprising in the GDR in June of 1953 that was put 
down only with the help of Soviet tanks, underscoring the 
fact that the regime was maintained only by virtue of Soviet 
occupation forces. Two months later, when the Western 
Powers proposed a meeting of the Four Powers to discuss the 
reunification of Germany and a peace treaty with Austria, it 
led again only to Western demands that an all-German govern­
ment be based on free elections and to the Soviet demand
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that a provisional government be set up on the basis of the 
existing governments.62
But Anton DePorte points out that despite the open 
hostility, the rearmament of Germany, and the absence of a 
peace treaty, peace and stability were maintained in Europe. 
He cites the Austrian Peace Treaty in the spring of 1955, 
the Great Power summit conference in Geneva in July, and the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between the FRG and 
the USSR in September, as examples of policies which con­
tributed to peace and stability.63 None of this came about 
until West Germany had been rearmed and the West Germans had 
accepted that rearmament would make reunification a matter 
to be dealt with in the distant future.
The aftermath of the Soviet note of March 10 reinforced 
for all parties that the Four Power efforts to deal with 
Germany had never been a cooperative effort by allies, but 
had always been a struggle of adversaries for the future of 
Europe. It was only after all parties acquiesced in the 
freezing of the status quo along its predetermined lines 
that all could recognize that the division of Europe was a 
stable situation and formed the basis for, if not a friendly 
peace, at least a relatively non-threatening stalemate.
This was possible because between the superpowers there were
62Luard, p. 28.
63DePorte, p . 164.
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limited alternatives, and each side had the opportunity to 
realistically assess the possibilities and limits.
CHAPTER V
THE SECOND BERLIN CRISIS 1958-1961
The opening salvo in the second Berlin crisis was 
lobbed by Khrushchev at a Polish-Soviet Friendship meeting 
held in Moscow November 10, 1958. He said that in creating 
the GDR, a democratic, peace-loving, antifascist and anti­
militarist workers' state by his account, the Soviet Union 
had lived up to its obligations under the Potsdam Agreement. 
The West, however, by allowing fascist and revanchist pas­
sions to drive the FRG to militarism, had grossly violated 
the spirit of Potsdam. In Khrushchev's view, the only thing 
the West retained from Potsdam was the occupation of Berlin, 
and they only continued this in order to subvert the GDR.
In a note to the United States on November 27, 1958, 
the Soviets formalized the charges: the Western Powers had
violated the Potsdam agreements, forfeiting their right to 
occupy Berlin; they had refused to conclude a peace treaty 
with Germany, or in its absence, with the two German states; 
the West had used West Berlin for the purpose of subverting 
the GDR. Therefore, the USSR demanded that the West must 
abandon its occupation regime and West Berlin must become a 
"free city"— demilitarized, neutral, guaranteed by the four 
powers, and dependent on negotiations with the GDR for
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access rights. The Soviets proposed that there be no
unilateral changes in Berlin*s status for six months.
It is often argued that the Soviet's demand was not
serious in that they by no means wanted the West to abandon
Berlin at this time. Rather, by putting pressure on Berlin
they might force the West to negotiate over Germany. As
John Mander reasoned:
By eliminating both the Allied and the West German 
presence from the city, the Communists would throw 
away the lever by which they hope to influence 
Germany as a whole. If they are genuinely con­
cerned about German 'militarism* and 'revanchism' 
they would surely be reluctant to do this.64
Similarly, Jack Schick opined: "Berlin crises are Moscow's
way of opposing Bonn's polices: in 1958 it feared nuclear
weapons acquisitions; in 1948 it opposed resurgence of
German economic power."65 In other words, when the West
instituted monetary reform, the Soviets tried to stop it by
blockading Berlin. When the question of German rearmament
first came up, no Berlin crisis was necessary because the
European Defense Community failed, but Stalin did issue the
note of March 10, 1952, holding forth the prospect of
reunification, to forestall West German integration into
NATO.
The second Berlin crisis began after Sputnik had shown 
that the Soviets had the capability to produce long-range
64John Mander, Berlin: Hostage for the West (Baltimore
Penguin Books, 1962), p. 72.
65Schick, p. xvi.
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missiles. In response in 1958, the West Germans urged the 
Eisenhower Administration to deploy nuclear weapons in West 
Germany under the terms of the December 1957 NATO agreement 
ensuring American control of warheads. Moscow stepped up 
its campaign to have Central Europe declared a nuclear free 
zone and proposed other regional disarmament proposals.
'•The United States listened to Bonn as an ally of course,” 
Jack Schick wrote, "but Khrushchev could always catch the 
ear of the President by reheating the crisis and threatening 
to blockade the city."66
Walter Ulbricht, the head of the GDR's ruling Socialist 
Unity Party (SED), was much more anxious than Khrushchev to 
see the Western powers vacate West Berlin. In addition to 
the constant outflow of refugees sapping his county's labor 
force, West Berlin was embarrassing because many residents 
of East Berlin commuted there daily to work, enjoying the 
higher wage rate earned in West German marks. Although the 
official East German exchange rate was 1:1, in West Berlin 
the eastern currency was only worth five to the West German 
mark. But whilst working in the west, workers benefited 
from government subsidies in housing and food in the East 
Germany socialist economy. Furthermore, the presence of 
Western occupying forces in the German capital 100 miles 
from the GDR-FRG frontier was an embarrassing denial of GDR 
state sovereignty. If the Soviet Union did not, in the end,
^Ibid., pp. 8-9.
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really want the Western powers to leave the city and deprive 
them of easy access to a pressure point, Ulbricht, caring 
less for concerns of superpower balance than for the surviv­
al of his regime, did want them out. On October 27, 1958, 
Ulbricht described West Berlin as an island of the Cold War 
in the middle of the GDR.67
While the East German regime hoped for a drastic change 
in the situation which would end the outflow of refugees and 
gain it legitimacy and recognition, the West Germans under 
Chancellor Adenauer strove to preserve conditions under 
which the German situation looked temporary. In other 
words, in order to continue the claim that the West was 
actively working to unite Germany in freedom, Adenauer 
opposed any action which lent the suggestion that the 
division of Germany had become permanent. Preservation of 
the four-power occupation status of the German capital was 
an important part of making a long-standing condition look 
temporary. The Soviets' demand that a peace treaty had to 
be signed to normalize an abnormal situation only contribut­
ed to the appearances Adenauer wanted maintained.
Beginning on August 30, 1960, the GDR instituted a 
selective blockade of West German traffic (Western military 
traffic was excepted) in order to protest a rally of refugee 
organizations scheduled in West Berlin. The GDR broke
67David M. Keithly, Breakthrough in the Ostoolitik: The
1971 Quadripartite Agreement (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986),
p. 15.
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precedent by issuing the order in the name of the GDR 
Minister of the Interior rather than the Mayor of Democratic 
(East) Berlin, for the first time officially treating East 
Berlin as a part of the GDR. The Western commanders pro­
tested the blockade as a violation of quadripartite status. 
The blockade was lifted when the refugee groups departed 
September 4.68
On September 8 the GDR announced that FRG citizens 
would require special passes to enter East Berlin and that 
West Berliners could enter by showing their West Berlin 
identity cards but not FRG passports. When Bonn refused to 
let West Berliner's use their ID cards for travel to the 
East this amounted to a ban on travel. Bonn retaliated on 
September 30 by threatening to cancel the interzonal 
(FRG—GDR) trade agreement just concluded and scheduled to go 
into effect January 1. Ulbricht announced on November 7 
that goods from West Berlin to the FRG would be subject to 
"inspection requirements." Bonn proposed on December 1 that 
trade be renewed in exchange for lifting the travel restric­
tions. GDR officials showed interest in the talks, but not 
in the proposed linkage. On December 18 Ulbricht threatened 
to halt a portion of FRG traffic to West Berlin after 
January 1 on the grounds that the 1949 New York Agreement 
lifting the blockade was dependent on the viability of 
interzonal trade. A compromise was reached December 21
68Schick, p. 130.
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whereby the trade agreement was reinstated in exchange for 
the GDR lifting the inspection requirements and pledging 
that the travel restrictions would not be permanent. The 
trade agreement was restored on December 29. According to 
Schick: "Ulbricht successfully compelled Bonn to choose
between access to East Berlin or access to West Berlin. As 
expected, Bonn chose the latter.69
On June 3-4, 1961, President Kennedy and Khrushchev met 
in Vienna where Kennedy tried to convince Khrushchev that 
the U.S. was prepared to go to war if the access routes to 
Berlin were threatened. Khrushchev tried to convince 
Kennedy that the Soviets were prepared to go to war to 
defend GDR sovereignty if the West insisted on remaining in 
Berlin after the Soviets signed a peace treaty with Germany. 
The Soviets reissued a demand that a peace treaty recogniz­
ing the emergence of two German states, ending Western 
occupation rights in Berlin, and turning West Berlin into a 
free city be concluded without delay.
Speaking to the country by television June 15, Khrush­
chev said, "We ask everyone to understand us correctly: the 
conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany cannot be post­
poned any longer, a peace settlement must be attained this 
year."70 He went on to declare that if certain countries
69Ibid. , p. 13 2.
70George D. Embree, ed., The Soviet Union and the German 
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Nijhoff), p. 318.
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refused to participate in negotiations for a peace treaty 
the Soviets would sign one with the two German states. And 
if the FRG would not sign,"we shall sign it with the German 
Democratic Republic alone, which has long declared its 
desire to conclude a peace treaty and has agreed to the 
formation on her territory of a free city of West Berlin.”
He continued, "There are some in the West who threaten us, 
saying that if we sign a peace treaty it will not be recog­
nized and that even arms will be brought into play to 
prevent its implementation." He claimed that in this case, 
as in the case of the West violating GDR sovereignty and 
moving to and from West Berlin by land, sea, or air without 
GDR permission after the conclusion of a peace treaty, the 
Soviets would be able defend against such aggressions.71
On the same day Ulbricht held a press conference in 
Berlin in which he said that there were no plans to build a 
wall between east and west Berlin. This most likely re­
flected his hopes that the Soviets would allow him to pursue 
his maximum objective, driving the West from West Berlin. 
According to Robert Slusser, while the West Berlin question 
and the demand for a peace treaty were seen by Khrushchev as 
levers to force the West to acknowledge a shift in the 
international balance in favor of the Soviet Union, for 
Ulbricht securing control of West Berlin was an end in 
itself— or rather a "cluster of related goals": elimination
71Ibid. , pp. 316 and 318.
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of the outpouring of workers and the youth, enhancement of 
the GDR's international prestige, and stabilization of its 
political and economic position. "The international aspects 
of the Berlin problem were of secondary interest to 
Ulbricht; his eye was fixed on a definite target— absorption 
of the Western Sectors of Berlin."72
Ulbricht*s conditions for a free and neutral West 
Berlin included: termination of political asylum to escap­
ees from the GDR, elimination of all western spy and "human 
trade" organizations that the GDR pretended were responsible 
for the mass disappearance of citizens into the Western 
Zone, closing of the refugee facilities, Western guarantees 
of GDR sovereignty in the overland transit routes and in the 
air corridors, and renunciation of all Western rights in 
Eastern Germany.73
For Kennedy there were three guarantees for Berlin that 
could not be surrendered: security, free access, and
economic viability.74 On July 25, he addressed the American 
public on what had become the Berlin Crisis. In his speech, 
he defined the threat to Berlin as a threat to free men the 
world over. U.S. interest in Berlin required continued U.S.
72Robert M. Slusser, The Berlin Crisis of 1961: Soviet
American Relations and the Struggle for Power in the Kremlin. 
June-November 1961 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1973), p. 9.
73Keithly, p. 23.
74Mander, p. 74.
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military presence, access and egress for the U.S. garrison, 
and security and vitality for West Berlin. He requested 
congressional authority for the mobilization of selected 
military units and he proposed negotiations with the Sovi­
ets.75 Kennedy expressed a willingness to get rid of 
"irritants” surrounding West Berlin to which the Communists 
objected,76 but on the question of continued Western pres­
ence Kennedy's words were clear. "We cannot and will not 
permit the Communists to drive us out of Berlin, either 
gradually or by force."77
The speech was clear on the aspects of the status quo 
in Berlin on which the West would not give way, but by its 
omissions not so clear on the other aspects of the crisis. 
Schick noted: "The Soviets probably didn't know what to
make of Kennedy's speech in which he said nothing about East 
Berlin. They noticed in Vienna that Kennedy seemed more 
concerned about the practical aspects of Western access to 
West Berlin than about any other issue in the Berlin cri­
sis."78 This is because there was considerable concern on 
the Western side of the border about the consequences of the 
outflow of refugees and the measures to which it would drive 
the Communists. It was feared that if the measures were too
75Schick, p. 149-50.
76Mander, p. 78.
^Slusser, p. 82.
78Schick, p. 160.
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harsh, there would be an uprising in the East and the West 
would be in a quandary over the proper response. Even in 
the Federal Republic there were concerns that if too many 
people of the GDR came west, they would be replaced with 
Poles and Czechs and the region would lose its German 
character. In the USA on July 3 0 Senator Fulbright said on 
TV, "I don't understand why the East Germans don't close 
their border because I think they have a right to close 
it."79 Similarly The New York Times wrote on August 4:
"There has never been any East-West agreement that would 
prevent the Communists from closing the border between East 
Germany and East Berlin. Why they have not done so in the 
past is something of a mystery."80
On August 7 Khrushchev made another speech threatening 
to sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR and talking 
about the horrors and destruction that thermonuclear war 
would bring in its wake. He called West Berlin a "conve­
nient loophole to obstruct the GDR as a socialist state" and 
vowed the loophole would be closed.81
And so it was. Shortly after midnight on August 13 the 
GDR published a Warsaw Pact declaration, adopted on August 
6, that accused the FRG of using Berlin for subversive 
activities and requested the GDR to take measures to secure
79Slusser, p. 94.
80Ibid.
81Schick, p. 159.
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the border with West Berlin. As a signal to reassure the 
West the note added: "It goes without saying that these
measures must not affect existing provisions for traffic and 
control of communication routes between West Berlin and West 
Germany.1,82
As the announcement was being made, a legion of heavily 
armed East German guards were stringing barbed wire across 
the Potsdamer Platz. This was subsequently replaced with a 
wall. The GDR announced new travel restrictions: East 
Germans could cross West Berlin borders only with special 
permission (i.e., not at all); East Berliners would be 
reguired to obtain a special permit for crossing to West 
Berlin (i.e.., they could no longer cross); West Berliners 
would have to show their identity cards to enter East 
Berlin; "revanchist politicians and agents of West German 
militarism" would be barred from East Berlin; former deci­
sions on control remained valid for West Germans entering 
East Berlin (making the 1960 restrictions permanent); and 
non-Germans would be unaffected.83 The measure was an 
important one for the GDR, for it halted the loss of manpow­
er, put an end to the embarrassment of East Berliners 
working in the West, and effectively denied the quadripar­
tite status of the city.84
82Ibid. , p. 163.
83Ibid.
MIbid., p. 171.
75
The American response was cautious, revealing a mix of 
moral outrage and political relief. On the day the barri­
cades went up, Secretary of State Dean Rusk issued a "State­
ment Concerning Travel Restrictions in Berlin," noting, 
"Available information indicates that measures taken thus 
far are aimed at residents of East Berlin and East Germany 
and not at the Allied position in West Berlin or access 
thereto." He went on:
Limitation on travel within Berlin is a violation 
of the four-power status Of Berlin and a flagrant 
violation of the rights of free circulation 
throughout the city. Restrictions on travel 
between East Germany and Berlin are in direct 
contravention of the Four-power agreement reached 
at Paris on June 20, 1949.
In view of the seriousness of what had transpired, he warned
of the following action: "These violations of existing
agreements will be the subject of vigorous protest through
appropriate channels."85
It was not yet clear to the Western Powers that the
wall was the only action planned by the Communists and they
preferred to hold retaliatory measures in reserve for when
the other shoe dropped. Perhaps this was a preliminary to
the signing of a peace treaty by the Soviets with the GDR
and the transfer of Soviet responsibilty for the West Berlin
access routes to the GDR. It was clear that German access
to East Berlin or East German access to West Berlin were not
issues the Western powers felt they could do much about. In
85Slusser, p. 135.
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East Berlin on August 25 Ulbricht told a rally that his 
regime would not seek to control Allied communications with 
West Berlin until a peace treaty had been signed.86
The pressure on the Western powers was effectively 
lifted by Khrushchev in his speech opening the Twenty-Second 
Communist Party Congress in Moscow October 17, in which he 
backed off his threat to sign a peace treaty before the end 
of the year. "The question of a time limit for the signing 
of a German peace treaty will not be so important if the 
Western powers show a readiness to settle the German prob­
lem. We shall not in that case insist on signing the peace 
treaty before December 31, 1961."87
The Berlin crisis began with a challenge to the agree­
ment allowing Britain, France and the United States to 
occupy sectors of the former German capital. Although the 
Soviets claimed that the Western powers had already lost 
their rights in Berlin and that the USSR could take unilat­
eral action, it never did so act and the West successfully 
indicated that forceful action would have resulted from any 
violation of the rule allowing Western access to West 
Berlin.
However, the West failed to indicate that there would 
be any considerable sanctions for the GDR's challenge to the 
quadripartite status of the city and the GDR moved to close
86Ibid. , p. 13 2.
87Ibid. , p. 310.
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the border between West and East Berlin. Publicly denying 
that the GDR had the right to do this while claiming no 
authority to stop it, the Western powers tacitly accepted 
that the GDR, which was not recognized in the West, had the 
right to control its borders and that East Berlin fell 
within those borders. Both sides, clearly understanding by 
the end of the crisis what the other side would allow, 
displayed a complete unwillingness to make even minor 
territorial concessions.
Clearly shown was that a mutual recognition of the 
borders from which neither would surrender an inch was more 
important than gaining recognition of any rights that 
crossed those borders; the West gave up access to East 
Berlin and the Soviet Bloc gave up threatening the access 
from the West to West Berlin. West Germany desired the 
continued access to all of Berlin as a means of demonstrat­
ing that the bipolar division was impermanent and the GDR 
illegitimate. The GDR, conversly, felt that control over 
all of Berlin was vital to its hopes of achieving both 
domestic and international recognition of state sovereignty. 
Neither got their way because of the necessity of following 
the leader of their alliance system. This was an important 
moment demonstrating that mutual recognition of the bipolar 
division of Europe was a crucial factor in easing tensions 
between the two sides. Allowing the threats to turn into a
crisis and dealing with it as such may have allowed the 
situation to stabilize rather than turning into war.
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CHAPTER VI
OSTPOLITIK AND THE TREATY OF AUGUST 12, 1970
The resolution of the second Berlin crisis in favor of 
the status quo led to some profound realizations by both 
German governments. The West Germans found that there was 
to be no rollback of Communism and thus had to accept that 
reunification from the West through strength was not a 
realistic short-term goal. Similarly, the East Germans 
found the Soviets unwilling to remove West Berlin as a 
capitalist outpost in the middle of their country, or even 
to make international recognition of the German Democratic 
Republic a condition for acknowledging Western access 
rights. But because it caused the West Germans to change 
their attitude about the nature of, and remedy for, the 
German problem, the construction of the Wall was to lead to 
some major challenges to the East German regime.88
In 1962, West German Foreign Minister Schroeder an­
nounced a new "policy of movement" (Politik der Bewegung). 
This policy sought to substitute economics for politics and 
was aimed at improving ties with states in Eastern Europe,
88N. Edwina Moreton, East Germany and the Warsaw Alliance; 
The Politics of Detente (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc.,
1978), p. 28.
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at East Germany's expense.89 It was hoped that these new 
East European trading partners would lose interest in the 
hard line politics of Walter Ulbricht.
The new eastern policy, or "Ostpolitik," beginning to 
take shape in the 1960s had several important goals. One 
goal was to improve the image of the Federal Republic and 
enhance its international status, not just in Eastern Europe 
but also in the Third World. A second was to pry open the 
door to the German Democratic Government and exert a moder­
ating influence in East Germany. Thirdly, "Ostpolitik" 
aimed to reestablish German influence in both the northern 
and southern tiers of East Central Europe and thereby 
obliterate as much of the legacy of the Nazi period as 
possible.90
An alliance between the Christian Democrats and the 
Free Democrats collapsed in 1966 and the CDU and CSU formed 
a grand coalition instead with the Social Democrats, bring­
ing the SPD into the government for the first time since the 
war. With Kurt Georg Kiesinger as Chancellor and the SPD's 
Willy Brandt as Foreign Minister, the new Ostpolitik was 
implemented. Previously the FRG selectively refused to 
recognize any country that recognized the GDR, a policy 
known as the Hallstein Doctrine. Accepting that Warsaw Pact
89Ibid. , p. 29.
^Andrew Gyorgy, "Ostpolitik and Eastern Europe," The 
International Politics of Eastern Europe. Charles Gati, ed. 
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), p. 154.
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states faced special circumstances, the new government 
sought to exchange ambassadors with whichever East Central 
European states were willing to participate. As an incen­
tive, the new government offered substantial economic aid in 
the form of trade and loans. The West Germans were willing 
to offer hard currency at low interest rates and long-term 
credit toward industrialization. This policy resulted in 
relations between the FRG and Rumania in 1967 and with 
Yugoslavia in 1968. Czechoslovakia and Hungary were about 
to fall into line when the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia 
intervened in 1968.91
In 1969, the SPD had the opportunity to lead the 
government and let the CDU/CSU go into the opposition.
Brandt became chancellor in alliance with the Free Demo­
crats. He and his foreign minister, the FDP's Walter 
Scheel, immediately sought to offset the international chill 
caused by the Czech invasion. Brandt felt that the only way 
to overcome the division of Germany was to seek accommoda­
tion with the existing political realities while trying to 
bridge the divide on a human level. Brandt realized that to 
reach all of the accommodations he was seeking, negotiations 
had to be pursued simultaneously on four levels in a fashion 
that maintained the linkage between each level. In late 
1969, he began a campaign to reach agreements on each of 
these levels; establishing trust first with the Soviet Union
9lIbid. , p. 156.
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to win access to the bloc, then with Poland to allay con­
cerns of revanchism, then working multilaterally to have the 
quadripartite status quo of Berlin formalized and stabi­
lized, and finally, dealing with the GDR and the FRG's 
proper relationship. He signaled his serious intent to the 
Soviets by signing the nuclear nonproliferation treaty.92
The Soviets were likewise willing to reach accommoda­
tions with the West in general and with West Germany in 
particular for a number of reasons. Tacit acceptance of the 
status quo during the Berlin crisis met many of the Soviet 
security demands. During the early 1960s Soviet policy 
aimed to change West Germany's foreign policy towards the 
East as a means of influencing the West by undermining 
Western cohesion, and thereafter reducing American influ­
ence. The Soviets hoped to encourage a greater acceptance 
from the West Germans for the division of Germany and the 
borders of Poland. The Soviets also wanted to prevent the 
increased West German activity in Eastern Europe from 
becoming a disruptive influence, but this policy seemed to 
contradict the Soviet desire to increase trade.93
By the late 1960s the Soviets felt that they had 
substantially caught up with the West in terms of nuclear 
armaments. Furthermore, the lack of response to the Soviet 
invasion of Czechoslovakia indicated clearly that the Soviet
^Ibid., p. 160.
93Moreton, p . 30.
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sphere of control in Eastern Europe would be respected.
Thus, from the Soviet point of view, there was now a limited 
opportunity to seek a way out of their growing technical and 
economic difficulties by seeking industrial and technical 
cooperation with the West without engendering too much 
dependence.94
Since West Germany was clearly not a military or 
nuclear threat to the Soviet bloc, the Soviets were able to 
seek economic and technical cooperation while hoping to 
reduce American influence in Europe and helping to reestab­
lish respectability for the French and Italian Communists, 
who had a hard time defending the Czech spring.95
With the Brezhnev Doctrine, which enunciated the right 
of the Warsaw Pact nations to intervene in member states 
militarily to prevent "counterrevolution,” which they had 
espoused and enforced through the Czechoslovak crisis, the 
Soviets had clearly indicated to the FRG that any future 
accommodations with the West would not be permitted to pose 
a threat to their control of their bloc. This ensured that 
relations with the FRG would be less costly than previously 
may have been feared.96
^Hansjurgen Schierbaum, Interaerman Relations; Develop­
ments . Problems. Facts (Munich: tuduv-Verlagsgesellschaft,
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By 1969, the leaders of the Soviet Poltiburo had 
converged on a policy of resuming negotiations with West 
Germany. Party leader Leonid Brezhnev was primarily con­
cerned with Soviet economic needs, while ideologist Mikhail 
Suslov felt that cooperation with the SPD might help further 
the communist cause. Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin hoped 
that economic cooperation might lead to arms control, and 
likewise, Nikolai Podgorny, also a Politburo member, warned 
of the opportunity costs of pursuing the arms race. Soviet 
Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko supported both the economic 
relations and arms control, and saw a link between detente 
with West Germany and detente with the United States.97
The minimum Soviet desiderata included a recognition of 
the territorial status quo in Eastern Europe and recognition 
that economic relations with the West would not alter the 
basic structure of the Soviet command economy. Significant 
military detente had not yet been decided upon. These 
conservative parameters seemed to rule out trying to pry 
West Germany from NATO.98
The East German leadership had learned entirely differ­
ent lessons from the second Berlin Crisis than had the USSR. 
One was that a resolution of the crisis which required 
severing Western ties to West Berlin was beyond their 
control— such a decision remained the purview of the Sovi-
^Ibid., p. 164.
98Ibid.
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ets, and therefore something remained of four-power control, 
whether the East Germans would admit it or not. The other 
was that because international recognition of East Germany 
was limited, because of the FRG*s success at promoting the 
Hallstein Doctrine, the GDR had no choice but to deal with 
the world through its Warsaw Pact allies."
The West German campaign during the early 1960s to buy 
the friendship of these erstwhile friends of the GDR was 
therefore doubly troubling because if the East Germans could 
not get their allies to insist on FRG recognition of the 
German Democratic Republic before signing trade agreements, 
then the GDR risked isolation within its own alliance.
Before Brandt's reformulation of the West German approach, 
the GDR could at least count on the Soviets to prevent the 
West German effort from succeeding.100
The 1960s found the East German regime in much stronger 
shape domestically than internationally. After the Wall 
went up, the problem of the constant drain of the workforce 
across the border ceased and the leadership began to empha­
size the separate development of East Germany. The SED's 
second in command, Erich Honecker, warned Ulbricht that his 
continued insistence that the GDR must be the foundation of 
a united Socialist Germany was undercutting the ability of 
the GDR to build a separate sense of identity. The main
"Moreton, p. 37.
100Ibid. , p. 41-2.
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crisis facing the regime, according to this viewpoint, was 
not one of legitimacy, as seen by the West, but of its 
independent identity. The economic success of the GDR in 
the 1960s made the country stronger internationally, within 
its alliance, and made Ulbricht's leadership bolder.101
Ulbricht was well aware that the GDR was indispensable 
to the Warsaw Pact precisely because of its invaluable 
contribution to Soviet and East European economic develop­
ment. Any encroachment into the economic relations of 
Eastern Europe by West German economic power would incline 
East Germany's allies to agreements with the FRG at its 
expense.102 Ulbricht also understood that the Czech crisis 
was the manifestation of domestic economic discontent. He 
feared that these forces would push the Eastern European 
leaders into hasty agreements which might subject them to 
economic dependence on the West in general, and Bonn in 
particular. This would have compromised the political 
independence of the Soviet bloc states and given the FRG a 
dengerous level of influence. Ulbricht was therefore the 
first to criticize Dubcek and warn that his reforms were 
about to go too far. He tried to rally the Warsaw Pact 
behind a program of economic modernization "by our own
101Ibid. , pp. 38-40.
102Sodaro, p. 135.
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means.” He offered to have the GDR be the first to acceler­
ate its own economic development plans.103
When Brandt changed FRG policy to include a willingness 
to recognize the territorial status quo and to deal with the 
GDR on an equal basis, the Soviets resolved, for aforemen­
tioned reasons, to undertake negotiations; and when this 
occurred in late 1969, the GDR was brought into dialogue 
with Bonn very much against its will.104 The situation 
shows that the domestic and foreign policy needs of the GDR 
and its Warsaw Pact allies were inverted. While the threat 
of detente caused East Germany to step up its economic 
program, the need to step up their economic programs lead 
the other East Europeans to seek detente.105
There were five major threats seen by the GDR leaders 
as inherent in detente with the West. First, permitting the 
FRG to accept international borders with reservations 
concerning the Oder-Neisse line was unacceptably imperma­
nent. Second, having to acknowledge four-power responsibil­
ity for Berlin would mean losing the ability to claim full 
sovereignty, including control over the access routes.
Third, any increase in contact between the East and West 
Germany would allow the FRG to manipulate and influence the 
Communist bloc, and possibly cause a decline in the impor­
103Ibid. , p. 109.
104Moreton, p. 201.
l05Sodaro, p. 165.
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tance of the GDR within the bloc. Fourth, increased con­
tacts between the West Germans and the East Germans could 
very well undermine domestic support for the SED, which was 
built on its comparative achievement within the East but 
which could not compare with the achievements of West 
Germany. Fifth, the doctrine of eventual reunification, not 
surrendered by Brandt, implied that someday the German 
Democratic Republic might cease to exist.106 For these rea­
sons, the SED rightly suspected that any agreement reached 
by the Soviets and West Germany would tend to compromise 
away its minimum requirements, complete physical security of 
the East German state and its full, uncompromised participa­
tion in international relations.107
But the SED was not going to have a choice over whether 
the Soviets negotiated with the West Germans or not.
Because Brandt's approach to the German issues was pragmatic 
it enjoyed greater success than his predecessor's policy of 
denying the legitimacy of East Germany. Because detente 
involved heretofore unprecendented openness and cooperation 
between the blocs, it had come to require that cohesion be 
maintained within each bloc.108 So Ulbricht could not ob­
ject outright when the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic 
of Germany signed a treaty in Moscow August 12, 1970 that
106Ibid. , p. 167.
107Moreton, p. 201.
l08Ibid. , p. 107.
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renounced the use of force and established respect for the 
inviolability of borders. The FRG delivered a note to the 
Soviets the same day explaining that the Federal Republic of 
Germany would continue to seek German unity through free 
self-determination. But the West Germans agreed in the 
treaty to establish relations with East Germany based on 
equality and non-discrimination in terms of international 
recognition, and respect for independence and autonomy in 
matters concerning internal competency within their respec­
tive borders.109 Brandt indicated that a four-power agree­
ment on Berlin would be a prerequisite for West German 
approval of the treaty. The Soviets signalled their will­
ingness to consider further concessions by signing the 
treaty.110 By December, the West Germans had concluded a 
treaty with Poland recognizing that the Oder-Neisse line 
constituted the western frontier of Poland and renouncing 
the use of force to change borders.
The German Democratic Republic was deeply annoyed by 
the FRG-Soviet treaty. For one thing, the treaty did not 
require that the FRG recognize the GDR as a completely 
independent, sovereign, and therefore foreign, country under 
international law. For another, Ulbricht could no longer 
use the image of a revanchist militarist Federal Republic to 
demand bloc solidarity in support of his government.
109Ibid. , p. 150-1.
110Sodaro, p. 2 00.
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Finally, the treaty not only did not mention Berlin, but the 
Soviets were beginning four-power negotiations in response 
to Brandt's insistence on their necessity.111
Berlin was the key to the whole process, for a recogni­
tion of continued four-power control over Berlin implied a 
continued four-power responsibility for Germany as a whole—  
the legal basis for Brandt's insistence that there existed 
but one German nation. Berlin therefore continued to 
symbolize the ultimate lack of sovereignty by the GDR over 
its whole territory. Gaining the right to control access to 
Berlin was therfore important for the GDR. At this point in 
the negotiations, the pressure on the GDR between the West 
German challenge and the growing momentum of Soviet policy 
became acute.112
Ulbricht managed to bring the quadripartite talks to a 
stalemate temporarily when he tried to negotiate over 
transit to Berlin separately with West Germany, but the 
Soviets were quickly growing tired of his shenanigans, which 
verged on a declaration of independence from Soviet foreign 
policy. Soviet irritation helped bring to a head some 
conflicts over Ulbricht's economic policies within the SED 
leadership, leading to his replacement by Erich Honecker as 
First Secretary of the SED in the spring of 1971.113
inMoreton, p. 149.
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Honecker*s first foreign policy speech as the new SED 
chief on May 3, 1971, indicated his party's willingness to 
accept whatever compromises over Berlin the Soviet's agreed 
to. He referred to West Berlin as a "city with a special 
status" rather than the heretofore insisted upon "indepen­
dent political entity."114
The 1971 quadripartite agreement over Berlin recognized 
continued four-power responsibility for the city and guaran­
teed access from the West. Although West Germany was 
permitted to represent West Berlin in foreign affairs and 
maintain a close economic relationship with the city, the 
FRG had to agree that the city was not a constituent part of 
the Federal Republic and it agreed not to try to hold any 
more official gatherings there.
The agreement was a major blow to the German Democratic 
Republic on several fronts. Because civilian traffic was to 
be "facilitated" and given "preferential" treatment, the GDR 
lost the ability to obstruct such traffic, a means of exert­
ing pressure towards a political goal. The recognition of 
four-power responsibility meant no sovereignty by the GDR 
over the access routes and it bolstered Brandt's argument 
that there was still a four-power responsibility for Germany 
as a whole. The inter-German agreement on transit forced 
the GDR to negotiate with the FRG over Berlin, a matter in 
which the GDR had always maintained the FRG had no legiti-
114Sodaro, p. 212-3.
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mate interest. Finally, the agreement allowed West Berlin­
ers to visit East Berlin freely, and not just with special 
permission. After Ulbricht's departure, the interests of 
the SED leadership had not changed, but its willingness to 
openly defy Moscow had changed.115
In 1973, formal relations between the two German states 
were established. This relationship was not considered by 
the FRG to be a relationship with a foreign country, but 
rather a relationship that respected the GDR1s autonomy in 
matters within its borders, according to Brandt's formula­
tion of recognizing two states but only one nation. The 
Federal Republic continued to claim restricted authority 
regarding the German nation as a whole in order to maintain 
that the German question was still a matter to be resolved 
in the future. Nevertheless, both states became members of 
the United Nations.
While debating approval of the treaties between the FRG 
and the Soviet Union and Poland, the four main parties in 
the Bundestag (the SPD, the FDP, the CDU and the CSU) had 
reached a consensus on an interpretation that would not let 
the approval conflict with the FRG's Basic Law. This 
compromise affirmed that recognizing what constituted 
borders in the present did not lay a legal foundation that 
might be used to prevent establishing new borders that can 
only be established by a treaty of peace. Furthermore, the
n5Ibid. , p. 214.
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treaties did not negate four-power responsibility for 
Germany as a whole or Berlin as whole. After some reluc­
tance, Soviet Ambassador Valitin Falin informed Scheel that 
Moscow would acquiesce in the Bundestag's interpretation.
The Nixon Administration let the CDU know that it would like 
to see a yes vote on the treaties— which sent a positive 
signal to the Kremlin regarding America's willingness to 
intercede with its allies in the interest of detente. After 
pressure from groups of Germans who had been refugees from 
the eastern provinces, CSU leader Franz Josef Strauss backed 
out of the compromise, and the CDU and CSU abstained, 
allowing the treaties to pass without their support.116 
Nevertheless, the treaties were seen as victory for Willy 
Brandt's "Ostpolitik" initiative in that they were perceived 
to have been a step toward overcoming the division of 
Germany rather than confirming it.117
The Soviet Union was widely interpreted as having won 
because the treaties recognized its hegemony over half of 
Europe. It lost only its questionable right to interfere 
with access to Berlin.118 But Brezhnev now chose a less 
accommodating path regarding the division of Europe than 
might have been possible. He chose to continue the arms 
build-up rather than risk the possible political dangers of
116Ibid. , p. 217.
117Schierbaum, p. 42.
118Ulam, p. 754.
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disarmament. He realized that while disarmament might have 
helped reduce American influence in Europe, it might also 
have emasculated Soviet control over Eastern Europe because 
if West Germany were no longer considered a revanchist 
military threat, the East Bloc nations would grow less 
tolerant of Soviet troops stationed in their countries. The 
uncertainties of a less divided Europe were not attractive 
compared to the security of a Europe divided between two 
counterpoised military and ideological blocs. The firm 
continuance of West Germany in NATO was still an acceptable 
reality compared to an FRG with a much more independent, and 
less predictable, foreign policy.119
On the ideological front, too, the concept of coexis­
tence was not incompatible with a strong bipolar rivalry. 
While the new rules explicitly renounced the right to 
intervene militarily in another country (of an opposing 
bloc, anyway), communists could not ignore that socialism 
and capitalism continued to be in constant struggle and that 
this struggle would continue to manifest itself in internal 
efforts for class liberation. This process would continue 
to be encouraged materially and politically by the socialist 
community. According to Stephan Doernberg, Director of the 
GDR Institute for Politics and Economy:
Peaceful coexistence is a category of internation­
al relations in a era of worldwide transition from
capitalism to socialism. It includes the dialec-
119Ibid. , p. 202.
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tical unity of fight and cooperation on the 
various fields of relations with the aim of di­
recting the conflicts between the socialist and 
imperial states rooted in the antagonism of the 
two social systems into peaceful channels. An 
ideological coexistence is, however, impossible, 
as socialist and bourgeois ideology are irrecon­
cilably opposed to one another. It also is not
and cannot be a guarantee of the status quo.120
The cooperation achieved between the Soviet Union and
the Federal Republic of Germany led more immediately to an
agreement to renounce the use of force, recognized the
reality of postwar arrangements, opened up the East in terms
of trade and human contact, and led to broader achievements
in detente such as SALT, the end of the war in Vietnam, and
the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe,
including the Helsinki Final Act.
In more important ways, the treaties did confirm and
strengthen the bipolar division of Europe. The Soviets were
left with firmer control over their Warsaw Pact allies, and
this control was tacitly approved by both the West Germans
and the West. The Soviets also maintained a formidable arms
position and, despite coexistence, found enough outlets for
superpower rivalry to occupy better than a decade. West
Germany likewise strengthened the Western position by
obtaining access to the Eastern Bloc while giving the
campaign for reunification on Western terms new life through
a fresh, innovative and nonthreatening approach. This
120Schierbaum, p. 27
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approach remained firmly anchored in the NATO alliance and 
never created a third way between the superpowers.
CONCLUSION
During the Interwar Period, the three examples examined 
display many of the hoped-for characteristics of a multi­
polar classical balance of power system, and, more impor­
tantly, all of the most dreaded characteristics of said 
international arrangement.
During the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, the Bolshe­
viks vacillated between their three alternatives (deal with 
Germany, deal with Western powers, or incur the ire of both) 
and charted the most opportunistic course allowing survival 
of revolution at home and independence of action interna­
tionally. The Germans, by dealing with the Bolsheviks, 
managed to make their subsequent defeat inconclusive at best 
because Germany was only defeated on one front. It also 
helped give the Bolshevik regime a better chance of surviv­
al, which proved problematic to the West after the war. 
Britain and France had the difficult task of trying to 
squelch revolution in Russia while trying to convince 
Germany that it had indeed lost the war, and should accept 
any terms of peace deemed appropriate by the victors.
This three-sided arrangement wreaked havoc with the 
Genoa conference and the attempt to reintroduce Russia and 
Germany as respectable concert-of-Europe players. Soviet
97
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diplomats successfully played Germany off against Britain 
and France, winning for the USSR virtually cost-free 
readmission into the family of nations by signing the 
Rapallo Treaty. Germany vacillated between the perceived 
opportunity to work as an integral (though second class) 
part of the West, or take advantage of its first real 
opportunity to become again a major independent player. 
Britain and France proved unable to keep Germany on board 
with a united plan for dealing with Russia.
Finally, Stalin allowed Hitler to invade Poland while 
guaranteeing that Britain and France would go to war over 
it, the Soviet Union would be left out (for two years, 
anyway), and the Soviets would be able to claim some spoils 
from the deal to use as a temporary buffer against the 
German attack they knew was to come. Hitler was able to buy 
Soviet neutrality and gave himself the option of avoiding a 
two-front war.
Had the balance of power been less multipolar in each 
of these three circumstances; had Britain and France the 
relative power to make any of these three instances bipolar 
instead, they surely would have done so, regardless of what 
some might say about the merits of a multipolar system. Had 
Britain and France been stronger or either Germany or Russia 
weaker, they might have had the chance to send troops to the 
Eastern Front to prevent Russia's revolution and its with­
drawal from the war. They might have been able to hold
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Germany in their camp at Genoa without fear of German 
recovery and independence. They might have stopped Hitler's 
aggression earlier. But they had to deal instead with a 
multipolar distribution of power, and one is reminded of the 
observation of Rosecrance on multipolarity: it raises the
difficulty of policy-making, because choices become complex 
and results unforeseen.
With hindsight, there seemed to have been no such 
problems of excessively complex arrangements of power in the 
Cold War Europe of bipolarity. Before Stalin issued the 
note of March 10, 1952, the United States would have gladly 
disengaged from Europe after the war, but the Soviets posed 
a threat which the U.S. could not ignore. France would have 
had the Germans never rearm, but France did not have the 
choice. The Soviets would have liked to have had no securi­
ty concerns, but the outside world contained too much power. 
German democrats would have chosen unity, but there was no 
guarantee of elections or sovereignty. German communists 
would have likewise chosen unity, but there was no assurance 
they could win an election.
When Khrushchev threatened the Western presence in 
Berlin, the West was absolutely unwilling to surrender even 
an inch of territory. The crisis seemed to take the world 
to the brink of war, but the stakes were clear, the division 
of responsibilities understood and interests defined. The
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Western Powers were willing, however, to allow the other 
side title to what was effectively already its.
During Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik offensive, although 
the levels of competition deepened to include comparative 
domestic support and economic power, issues of contention no 
longer posed any threat to borders or bloc control. The 
Soviet bloc was secure under the Brezhnev Doctrine; Soviet 
control was practically now sanctioned by the NATO coun­
tries. So when the Soviets decided to pursue detente from a
position of strength, the East German regime had no choice 
but to fall into line, no matter how inimical the policy was 
to its own interests. The bipolar division eliminated most 
of the options for most of the countries, but the stability
of the system continued for lack of a serious third force
challenge.
As Waltz observed: "The constancy of effort of the two
major contenders, combined with ... their preponderant 
power, have made for a remarkable ability to comprehend and 
absorb within a bipolar balance the revolutionary political, 
military and economic changes that have occurred."121 
He noted that the two "losses" of China (presumably the 
first by the United States when the Nationalists fled the 
Mainland, and the second by the Soviet Union when the Sino- 
Soviet rift occurred in the late 1950s) barely affected the
121Waltz, p. 886.
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balance of power between the United States and the Soviet 
Union.122
If bipolarity is such a wonderful thing, what can be
said for a world that no longer enjoys it? For one thing,
much depends on whether the world becomes multipolar,
unipolar, or a new bipolarity emerges (or the old one
returns). Unipolarity was said by Haas to be more stable
but by Levy to be less. Rosecrance had another prediction
concerning the loss of bipolarity:
If detente is desirable, it is possible to have 
too much of a good thing. A total bipolar rap­
prochement, an end to the Cold War, would be 
likely to create a new bilateral tension between 
major power and multipower spheres. In practical 
terms it would represent a conflict of rich coun­
tries and poor countries ... . This emergent 
bipolarity would demand a rapid spread of nuclear 
weapons in previously multipolar areas.123
Based on an understanding of the relative merits of
bipolarity and multipolarity, a wise course of action may be
to attempt to create a more unipolar world order with the
sober expectation that a bipolar world may be an expectable
result and a survivable fallback position.
122Ibid. , p. 887.
123Rosecrance, p. 322.
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